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PREFACE
This manuscript was prepared in late 1995 as [he result of several related research streams,
First, the author was conducting field research on automotive distribution and retailing with in
his role as Associate Director of both the International ?vfotor Vehicle program (I~lVpJ ~[ [he
Massachusetts [nstltute of Technology and the International Car Dlstrlbution Program
(ICDP), an independent non-profit research consortium studying distribution worldwide,
Second, the author has been conducting independent field research into companies
developing what are commonly called “new media” technologies.
In 1994, these streams began to converge in ways almost unimaginable several years earlier,
This article is an early attempt to illustrate some of the patterns and trends emerging in three
major industry sectors: automotive, information technologies, md advertising/broadc mting.
These industries have always been related, but the author began to notice completely new
approaches in all three areas appearing at field sites --- approaches that beg~n to change Jge -
old relationships, and pointed to completely new ways of doing business.
Some of the material in this article is already dated. People only half-joking talk ~bout
“intemet years” being four weeks long --- so fast is the current rate of change in the topics
treated in this paper.
Having said that, the core logic of the wticle remains solid in Mer 1996, and is increasingly
supported by the actions of businesses who are now investing heavily in the fledgling new
media systems discussed in this article.
The manuscript is being released in its current form to help discussion in the ongoing
research process. The point of this paper is to stimulate further discussion, not to make
sweeping predictions of the future. All comments are welcome.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ELECTRONIC NEW MEDIA AND THE A lJTO [N DUSTRY:
NEW DIMENSIONS IN MARKET-FACING SYSTEMS
Martin Anderson
BABSON COLLEGE
and
International Car Distribution Program
International Motor Vehicle Program
Revolutions often start well before the first shots are fired.
Deep social trends develop over time, waiting for some precipitating event, a new set of leaders, or a
technology that allows organizations to behave differently. The precipitating event usually catches our
attention, or seems surprising --- but the direction of the revolution is typically evident well beforehand,
This manuscript is about converging trends in three major industries — autos, information technologies,
and “media” (including advertising and the broader media) — trends that almost certainly presage a
revolution in “market facing” systems that link these industries to their markets, and to each other.
Each industry has created revolutions in the past, and has demonstrated the “early warning” phenomenon.
l The first “auto-mobiles” were invented about a century before the Ford and Daimlers commonly
thought to be the early prototypes of today’s cars. Early “steam engines on oxcarts” really started
the revolution that seemed to take off with the Ford assembly line decades later.
l “Computers” were invented decades ago. And while they were “revolutionary” in the 1940’s and
1950’s, those developments wgre merely early hints at the significant upheaval we now experience
in computation and communications industries.
l The broadcast industries, seeded in the last half of the 1800’s through telegraphy and telephony,
have revolutionized the way the modem world communicates, develops culture, and conducts
commerce. Advertising bonds the media indusny to the broadcast media industries.
While it is impossible to predict the future, it is possible --- when one steps back from the daily battle for
the bottom line --- to reflect on social trends that are waiting for precipitating events. Then, when
precipitating events really do happen, it is easier to understand at least the basic directions the revolution
will take.
As of the mid- 1990’s we see merging trends in three major industries:
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. Internet-style communications and related technologies are developing at an unheard of pace in
the electronics and communications industry.
. Simultaneously, the advertising and “broadcast” media (TV, Radio, Print, Etc. ) are undergoing
fundamental shifts in how they operate.
l And, the auto industry, owing to a thirty-year progression in global competition is seeking
major changes in its distribution, retailing, and service end of the business. . to match the
revolution that has already taken place in manufacturing.
These three trends are coalescing because:
l The “internet-style” technology is not only forcing changes in the electronics business, but is
the fundamental driver of change in the advertising and broadcast media businesses.
l The “intemet-style” technologies are aHowing major changes in the way cars are distributed.
sold, and serviced.
l The automobile business is one of the major financial pillars of the advertising and
“broadcast” media industries.
l The advertising and media industries are o major player in the selling and distributing of cars.
In short, three industries at the root of modern society, find themselves locked together -- still mysteriously
-- in a strategic revolution, with thousands of jobs ands hundreds of billions of dollars of commerce at
stake.
But this is not all. The merging industrial trends are linked to deeper social [rends,
l A generational demographic shift favoring visual media
l A desire to use new communication forms that may imitate similar periods after the invention
of the printing press, telegraph, and other technologies.
l A shift in media consumption away from the standard broadcastiprint mix of the past several
l And -- seemingly related only to autos, but fundamentally related to all industries -- the
decades-old consumer frustration with car retailing and distribution.
Because all these forces are converging across several industries, we can be fairly certain we are in the early
stages of an industrial-consumer revolution.
Even though this story is about autos, ~e should not think the revolution stops here. Just as the American
revolution had indirect effects on the one in France, the auto revolution is intricately and subtly tied to a
lugerind~~al pr~ess.Becausemany of these trends are being played out most rapidly in the car
business, with some of the largest dollar results — it is instructive to look to the auto changes to gain
insight into the revolution as it rolls out in other industries.
This paper is an exploratory strategy piece, based upon field research, that makes several fundamental
points:
l New electronically based technologies allow customers to demand things they have never been
able to demand before (easier ways to shop, for example).
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l Since auto customers are a huge population and have been looking for better ways to shop for
cars for years, they are latching on to the new technologies. even though these technologies
are hard to use --- a predictor of future demand.
. The auto industry is a fertile field for new industrial applications of “internet-style”
technologies, because it is a massive “latent sysrem waiting to be wired together”. It has
existing information systems spread throughout its trillion dollar sector --- all of which can
benefit from new forms of communicating with each other.
. In all industries, but especially in autos, there is a crying need to connect the “market-facing”
parts of the business (murketing, advertising, market research) to the “heavy metal”
manufacturing parts of the business.
l Because the new technologies will allow the existing “latent system” to connect as an actual
system, and because so many people will save or make so much money by doing so, the fiuto
industry will move relentlessly to connect the “market-facing” systems to the design and
manufacturing systems.
l Because today the advertising and media industries are heavily dependent members of the
“market-facing” part of the auto industry, as the consumer driven demand to hook up the latent
system rolls out through the industry, advertising and media companies will be swept along in
the revolution. If they are to remain viable, they will have to adopt new strategic postures.
l All of these revolutionary moves will be backed up with strong economic incentives:
l
l
l
l
Car buyers want cheaper cars and will shift buying to berrerchannels
The returns on investment in the car business depend on getting major capi[al
productivity gains in distribution and retail
The advertising and media companies cannot afford to lose the billions of dollars they
get from car distribution and retailing.
New external investors in car retailing and distribution will demand still tighter
performance, reinforcing the drive toward efficiency that can best be served-by
electronic technologies.
In short, the three major industries will be forced to see life in a very different way --- together. And they
will come up with often radical new ways to do business --- as they have done several times during the
century.
This article is aimed not just at the car industry, but also at members of the related communications and
media industries. It is not meant to be ~ prescription for the future, but rather an open reflection on a
number of trends observed in extensive field research. The bottom line of this manuscript is that no
position is right or wrong, but that it is possible to see the basic directions this revolution will take.
Given tha~ we should not be afraid to experiment with new industrial - consumer formats . . .. .and there is a
lot to lose if we don’t.
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A REVOLUTION BREWS
Car companies and retailers are facing
changes in buying behavior prompted by
new forms of electronic media. Rapid
expansion in on-line services and the
explosive use of the intemet have brought
a new form of consumer to the auto
market in North America: savvy
customers armed to the teeth with
information from traditional sources, and
from emerging sources resident in the
electronic world.
But new media are not just about new
ways to get information. New media
driven systems preview alternative ways to
select, find, and buy vehicles, linked to, but
moving beyond the traditional car
showroom. Customers are gaining much
more control over the buying process, and
they can make decisions much more
quickly if they know how to use the new
tools at their disposal. And they will
learn how to use these tools. Car buying is
one of the great social pastimes of modem
culture, so savvy customers will quickly
train others through world-of-mouth and
the vast cultural dialogue that surrounds
the car buying process.
Furthermore, in an entrepreneurial North
American auto market, free-wheeling, well-
moneyed players are responding to these
new customers by creating entirely new
retail and distribution channels for the first
time in decades. And, because the
distribution front end of the auto system
really paces the entire manufacturing and
design system, the front end changes that
now appear as novelties on some home
computers, will most likely reorganize the
basic strucmre of the entire auto system,
possibly faster than we think.
Also, because the advertising and media
industries are so heavily dependent upon
the “front end” of the auto business, the
auto revolution is bound to re-shape
fundamentals of the “marketing and
entertainment” industries as well.
Interlinked finances and technologies will
spur completely new consumer products
and services.
If this scenario seems too radical, think
back a short fifteen years ago. Then, none
of us had PC’S. AT&T controlled the
phone system from top to bottom. IBM
owned the world’s basic computer
architecture and virtually printed money.
Most automakers doubted that Japan could
have a huge $1500 per car cost advantage.
“Just-in-time” was a phrase uttered by
very few manufacturers. Cellular phones
barely existed. Faxes were expensive
corporate tools. Cable TV was still a new
business. CD-ROMS and video games
were dreams. We thought oil would soon
run out. If you told Wall Street types that
IPO’S of Microsoft and later Netscape
would yield hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars of capital value in a day,
they would have looked at you strangely.
Skeptics who bet against these trends
would have been ignoring the almost
biological integration of new technologies
into the human social system. Betting on
change is risky, but betting against basic
social movements is folly.
THE STORY STARTS WITH MARKETING
AND DISTRIBUTION
World-wide, the distribution and retailing
front end of the auto industry system
generates around $500 billion dollars of
economic activity each year (that’s half a
trillion dollars), and this economic engine
influences the remaining trillion dollars
generated in the manufacturing chain.
This value is based upon social behavior,
not upon corporate mandates, and because
the emerging new media and technologies
we see today are rapidly integrating into
social life, we can expect the social
changes to re-route large portions of this
1.5 trillion dollar economic being,
As of mid-1995, the new customers and
new buying methods represent only
fledgling trends, unseen by many, ignored
by some, and seized at the moment by
only the most prescient customers and
entrepreneurs (or intrapreneurs at the
massive car companies).
For two years, through the International
Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) at MIT
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and its research partner, the European-
based International Car Distribution
Program (ICDP) we have been studying
both the new “on-line” world and its
relationship to the vast field network of
automotive distribution, retailing, and
manufacturing.
Our field research shows that the “new
media” trends now underway are not only
rapidly growing and evolving, they are
based upon long pent-up consumer desires
for better ways to buy and use
automobiles. By quirk of history, these
new media trends also coincide with
strategic auto industry moves to streamline
the Iast remaining vestige of the “pre-
global” auto business: the traditional
relationship between makers, sellers, and
buyers of cars that hasn’t really changed
much for decades. Just as car design
moved from the era of tail fins to much
more complex product technology, and
manufacturing moved from “just-in-
case” high inventory manufacturing
methods to “just-in-time” lean
manufacturing, automotive distribution
and retailing are being transformed from a
“push the metal” model to a still-
undefined “customer pull” streamlined
system.
However, because these emerging media-
driven trends are based upon deeply
rooted economic factors long at play in
the auto business, and because they serve
customers well ,they presage structural
changes in the market that are as inevitable
as was the Japanese rise to power in the late
1970’s and early 1980’s.
In addition, because the new market trends
will complement manufacturing trends,
those companies who take advantage of
market changes to link their marketing
with manufacturing will find themselves
with powerful new systems of competition
that link factories and customers in new
ways. Followers will be hard pressed to
catch up, just as they were in the global
manufacturing revolution that started more
than 15 years ago.
“The intemet” and other forms of new
media do not simply represent some new
toy for customers to play with, or some
new way to “advertise”. They present
the means, in combination with innovative
distribution systems, for [he entire market
structure of the automotive world to shift
once again, re-sorting the various
competitors.
Since we are trying to connect a strategic
logic to detailed operating innovations
observed at ground level, we need to
explore two crucial strategic background
environments before examining the details
we see in field research. First, we need to
look at the media environment, which is
the primary reflection of broad social
change. Then we need to look at a bit of
auto history to show how this kind of
social change has effected the industry
before.
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The horizontal axis represents the degree
THE FIRST ENABLER: WHAT ARE of customer control over his/her use of the
“NEW MEDIA? medium: Technologies on the right offer
the least amount of user ~ontrol.
In mid- 1995 we were seeing a host of new technologies on the left offer the highes[
“convergent” technologies, each well degree of user control over the medium.
publicized. In simple terms, we are
looking at advances in: On the right (least user control) are
traditional broadcast TV and radio. A
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Proprietary on-line FI !.,. I sew Media Sw,eg,. Map
services (America On Integration Broadcaat
Line, CompuServe, ~~~~n~ and A TV\Radio
Prodigy, Delphi, and , ....
?
. * . .>:..-
HIGH ‘“4 .J,; >*.w, , ~ “,,:
others),
CD-ROM and related
,.y,y ‘.,:2.,’-:-”:-
-?=::~e”’
technologies (high
y
Cable,...M...
Commercial ;.,z.y-
density easily distributed On - Line
-“%%k$-.:~,g.. .,
,/”+,,. .. . .. . .‘L.
information), sarvkae
B
‘~,.’.;.<.?“=
the
,..~%-.,:,:.
“internet” (and a .,,$,”+ ‘.”3
?0”
,.-~;;.,.,.: ,i.‘.
.:,, ,>~: ,}:-&F..~: ‘ix
whole industry of .;$2,. .,,: : ,Y**;..#-“j:,7. - :.-.:
rapidly exploding .?~,$ Interactive ‘-
services),
.,. CableTV
“interactive” cable TV
(many varieties), D- ROMLOW
computer-based
networks (local, wide
~—, DEGREE OF USER CONTRUiil~
area, and galactic), HIGH LOW
derivatives of traditional telephony viewer can only exercise remote, slow
networks (voice mail, video acting control over network broadcast TV,
conferencing) by switching channels or by complaining
new uses for old networks (long long enough about program content that it
distance services and private shows up in network executives data
networks become instant “open reports. On the left (most user control)
systems” for products well beyond are stand alone CD-ROM (user can choose
telephone calls), and when, how , and what to access in vast
growth in software that astounds content stores), and “the intemet” which
even the wunderkinder who write offers users a degree of selection and
the miraculous new code control perhaps previously unknown in
(“rniddleware”, “biological” any media form.
style operating systems, clients and
servers, intelligent agents, etc.). The vertical axis represents a different
characteristic: the degree of separation
Each of these categories contain ‘miracles
only a modem day Jules Verne could have
seen ten years ago, but the real magic for
the auto business is in the combinations
these new technologies allow and in the
strategic pattern of these new media.
STRATEGIC INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION
Perhaps easiest to grasp is the strategic
pattern of the new technologies. Figure 1
represents a strategy map of the main
technologies, arrayed according to two
simple axes.
between the content o: the media’ and the
“pipes” that bring the content from the
content provider to the user. The top of
the axis represents a tight bonding of
“content provider” and “pipe owner”.
(The organization that creates the program
or movie is also the organization that
controls the way the program is shown to
the customer. ) The bottom of the axis
represents media in which there is a very
loose connection, or no connection
between the content provider and pipe
owner. (The organization that creates the
program transmits it over a distribution
means that is controlled by someone else.)
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Notice the pattern. Broadcast TV is in the
upper right area of the map, because there
is very little user control over the medium
and because the content provider and pipe
owner are for all practical purposes the
same. Those who choose what content to
create and show--- the broadcast networks
(NBC, ABC, CBS)--- are virtually the same
as those who provide the “pipe” that
conveys the content--- the network feed
and affiliate structure. In truth this
relationship is not so simple, because there
are complex means to generate TV
network content and transmit it, but in
comparison to the other
technologies/media on the map, the owners
of content and pipe are the same.
Witness “the intemet” on the other end of
the map. Content on the internet is
virtually unregulated; anyone can post
almost anything. In fact [he user can
simultaneously be viewer and a content
generator by creating a “home page”.
The “pipes” on the intemet are really a
“biomass” of loose connections, owned
by no-one, controlled by no-one. So, in
comparison to the rest of the
technologies/media on the map, the
intemet offers almost unlimited user power
to select content and almost complete
dissociation between content providers and
pipe owners.’
In the middle are the “proprietary
networks”. They offer users much more
control over content selection than
* An attribute of the intemet is that it represents the
opportunity for each user to create his/her own
“channels”. The user uses a browser (or newsreader,
FTP application, or other access software) as a
window on the vast net, and collects a series of
interesting content sites (“hot list”) or linkages
that can regularly bring the user whatever content
he/she chooses. Contrast this to the pre-packaged
network TV “channels” where the user is locked into
a single pipe (the network affiliate station) and
content chosen only by industry executives.
Browsers like Netscape are really becoming
“channel making tool kits” that enable individual
end users to become their own network executives.
The end user can also become a “content producer”
by allowing his/her content to be accessed by
millions of other users. This is the new network
paradigm that makes the new media revolution so
revolutionary.
broadcast TV and radio, but because they
do limit the content they offer and do
offer their services over limited proprietary
systems (“pipes”), they don’t offer the
complete freedom of the CCintemet like”
technologies.
Where is all the customer driven growth on
our map?.. .. ..in the least constrained
sectors of the map, Broadcast TV is quite
mature, but “intemet like” services are
booming.2 [f someone had set up an
index fund based solely on user growth in
the intemet, its investors could have paid
most of the national debt. Why? Because
this unrestricted fotm of social interaction
is highly desirable, and fits deeply within
the social fabric of the United States. It
even fits within the more socially
engineered political cultures of the world
in Europe and Asia.3 This sector of the
strategic media map is being driven by
participation from all cultures of the
human species, no matter where in the
world they live.
This, not so by-the-way, is the true
strategic power of “interactivity”. It’s not
just that users can see more movies on a
convenient schedule. It’s that no single
organization, even the largest governments
or corporations, can easily set the
boundaries of what customers (or
“citizens”) can do in the left-hand sectors
of the map. It’s not two-way interactivity.
It’s multi-way interactivity without
2 One has to carefully define measures of new media
size and usage, but most estimates suggest Internet
use has tripled during the 1994-mid 95 period.
Recent surveys suggest tens of millions of people
use new media in some regular way. The initial
public offering of Netscape has joined Wall Street
record books.
3 One might argue that the new media will be even
more novel in these political economies because it
will offer market freedoms almost instantly beyond
the reach of regulators and social market engineers.
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predictable boundaries. ~ People can
freely rearrange pipes and content to meet
even subtle changes in market cultures and
behavior.
The specific “strategic location” of this
new media growth is intuitively clear to
millions of customers, with meaning for
most modern industries, and special
meaning for the automotive industry.
DYNAMIC TECHNOLOGY COMBINATIONS
The second dimension of this new media
phenomenon, the combination of new
technologies, is less easy to define, because
it is happening faster than even well-
equipped industry analysts can follow
(there have been at least two generations of
new internet software during the rather
short gestation period of this article).
Despite the difficulty of forecasting
specific trends, the strategic meaning of
technology combinations
straightforward. While the hot grow~~
areas of new media are in the “lower left”
sectors of our map, mastery of the new
technologies requires attention to all
sectors, old and new, because they are
combining in ways that bridge
“traditional” customers and “techies” by
offering extraordinary ease-of-use to non-
technical individuals.
Recently we have seen some of the largest
“old” network owners---long distance
telephony carriers--- re-define the strategic
nature of their assets. We have seen AT&T
re-conceive of its telephone network from
a set of pipes to carry phone calls, to an
“environment” that can link almost any
of the media displayed on our ~trategic
map. We have also seen the intemet
become a long distance phone carrier,
d As an interesting mental exercise, try to envision
how value-added taxes will be collected on globat
intemet-derived product sales. Or, think about how
consumers in protected markets will feel when they
can see prices posted in on-line shopping malls that
are 40’%0lower than prices they see in their stores.
Right now users in protected markets can get new
software from free market sources simply by
downloading it over global networks. “Magazines”
posted in one nation can be viewed by readers in any
nation served by even rudimentary phone service.
enabled by a new software application that
bends the intended technology of “the
net” to a use possibly never conceived by
its pioneers: you can talk to friends over
the internet, without dialing a telephone
number or entering the billing systems of
telephony companies. Old meets new in
unique combinations. s
We are seeing changes in CD-ROM
capabilities (actually an “older”
technology) to allow links between ten-
year-old on-line services ~nd CD’s
resident on home computers. A user can
get blended information from disc storage
and remote dial-up computers
simultaneously, allowing high volumes of
content stored on disc to be activated by
the sparse commands coming over ‘-thin”
phone lines. A user can order software by
having the programs stored on a CD-ROM
activated by a “key” command that
comes over the phone line. Another user
can play a visually-rich video game in real
time with other players located throughout
the world; the video is stored on each
user’s CD, the game moves are simple
commands transmitted over the phone
connection between players. Still another
user can browse a catalogue stored on CD.
and get updated pricing, or a coupon for a
local retailer through simple commands
over the phone line from the distributor or
manufacturer. Two years ago, people were
wondering how they could get large
amounts of video or music content over
limited old phone lines; now the
combination of technologies allows
content to flow despite the technical
limitations of one medium or the other.
“Ordinary” non-technical users who had
mastered the simple act of playing a CD-
ROM, can participate in a “high tech”
system without mastering communications
electronics.
As we write, companies are beginning to
connect “thin” phone lines to “thick”
cable TV lines in new set-top boxes that
bring the telephone line across the living
5 At the time of writing, new software allows
“listeners” from around the world to access radio
stations that have a broadcast license for a much
narrower geographic area. Emerging compression
techniques will allow similar video transmission in
not too many years (months?)
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room to your color TV... the American
“electronic fireplace”. At the moment
the resulting combination allows only
limited services ---you can do some
telephone banking while the cable
company is broadcasting commercials.
But shortly entrepreneurs will launch
technology that will combine these two
very powerful media ---cable TV and
telephone--- in ways that neither industry
envisioned a while ago. The interactive
game providers are already in business on
this one. Home shopping organizations
will move into this combination with
ease ....and. the same customers who buy
dresses and exercise machines over cable
TV and 800 numbers are the ones looking
at the leasing brochures provided by car
companies.
“Massification” is happening quickly:
the basic “engines” that bring these
technologies together, personal computers
and other “smart boxes”, are becoming
widely distributed to more homes and
offices every day. When our auto field
research started almost three years ago, we
saw little evidence of the new media in our
showroom visits. Now, when we interview
dealers, we frequently hear stories from
salespeople about “average” customers
whose kids got them reams of on-line auto
buying information before they visited the
showroom. We have seen dealers who in
the last 12 months have created back room
“networks” from simple $4000 PC’s to
link up with “wired” potential customers.
We have seen dramatic increases in the
numbers of “newbies” (new users of the
internet) learning how to use the
automotive user groups on the net from
the smattering of “techies” who used to
be the only ones there. ye have
interviewed entrepreneurs who have
collected large e-mail lists of potential
customers shopping for cars on their new
“28.8” modems. And we have
interviewed surprised direct marketers
whose respondents to magazine ads
overwhelmingly requested product
“brochures” on CD instead of on paper.
In short, the intelligent boxes are already
out there, and the growing evidence is that
user friendly interfaces are bringing large
numbers of “ordinary Joe’s” ( a dealer’s
term) into the electronic world, b y
allowing them to combine known
experiences ---reading a magazine, visiting
a dealer, reading used car classified,
talking to neigh bors--- with novel
experiences
---getting car invoice data on
line, talking with dozens of owners in user
groups about their real-life experiences
with specific car models, getting a trade-in
quote on line, setting up a dealer service
appointment by e-mail, negotiating a new
car price through dealer e-mail, etc.
As the smart boxes begin connecting more
media, like cable TV and on-line services,
the rapid conversion of “traditional”
customers to “wired” ones will become
the norm. Customers will blend the known
media with the new media, because it helps
them with a very important purchase, and
because someone can make money
helping them do this.
WHEN WILL THIS BRAVE NEW WORLD
TAKE OVER? --- DON’T HOLD YOUR
BREATH. . . . TOO LONG
Just as many pundits have for years
characterized the Russian and Chinese
markets as “infinite and growing”, there
is a bit of a feeding frenzy surrounding
the rapid growth of electronic media.
Truly, many of the headlines of the past
year have been hype, and many of the
“immediate opportunities” have simply
been “vaporware”. It would be folly for
auto companies and retailers to throw away
proven methods in the face of highly
publicized recent trends.
But, just as it was nearly suicidal for many
companies to ignore the early warning
signs from Japan in the 1970’s, it will be
equally disadvantageous for them to treat
lightly the new market behaviors
emerging from behind the computer
screens in North American ---and
European and Asian--- homes.
Many people will want “data” on these
trends before they move to change
traditional investments in old-line
marketing, inventory management, and
retailing. That is a well-directed instinct.
But the true winners in the new marketing
world will be those astute managers who
can “intuit” the core trends from limited
data, and place their strategic bets in the
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right places ..... ... just as fledgling TV
network executives perceived the
importance of television before there were
Neilson ratings .....just as prescient telcom
entrepreneurs saw the emerging billions in
new services before anyone knew the price
of an unregulated phone call ....and just as
new retailers in non-automotive products
discovered on-the-fly systems to better
match production to rapidly changing
consumer tastes.
THE SECOND ENABLER:
UNBUNDLING THE FACTORY-
DE ALE R- CUSTOiMER
RELATION SHIP...
,.. RESURRECTING THE
“BRANDING SOUL” OF THE
IN DUSTRY6
When one understands how the industry
has been transformed in the past 30 years,
it is easier to see the patterns forming the
springboard for new media trends. The
“soul” of the auto industry has been its
branding..,, the unique combination of
physical things, information, and emotion
that has helped us distinguish Mercedes
from Chevrolets, Packards from
Studebaker.
There is a very specific “soul history” we
can follow -- leading to the revolution of
the 1990’s.
THE ORIGINAL TIGHT BUNDLE
In the 1950’s the relationship between car
makers, sellers, and buyers was a relatively
tight and friendly one. Car companies
designed and built cars, provided
information about those cars to the public,
and provided support services (training
and parts) to dealers. In the midst of a
post-war euphoria and before the “safety
wars” of the 1960’s, dealers were honored
members of the community and the
friendly local face of the car companies.
They helped families enjoy the new
American (and European) prosperity, gave
information to customers and fixed things
that went wrong with the then-reliable
American iron. Customers fell in love with
cars, enjoyed the information and help
they got from dealers, and waited
anxiously for the great social event created
by Detroit each year: the annual new
model launch. Each year families bought
new Keds and Peter Pan lunch boxes for
the kids going back to school, and traveled
to the local dealers to see the new models.
6 Credit should be given to Glen Mercer of
McKinsey & Co. for well analyzing and explaining
this trend.
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Americans went to the local neighbor who
had a TV to see the wondrous
advertisements touting the new V-8’s, fins,
and electric convertible roofs, A very tight
bundle indeed.
This bundle is central to understanding a
crucial, but subtle, element of the new
media revolution. In the old days the
“brand” of a vehicle rested on this tightly
knit fabric of factory-dealer-customer
relations. A “Chevy” or “Ford” or
“Dodge” brand was created by a
combination of the vehicle, the human
interactions between the factory, dealer,
and customer and most importantly ....the
information content that was intimately
tied to the factory-dealer-customer
relationship.
Simple themes like “Chrysler
engineering” could be conveyed from the
factory, through the dealer, among
customers who shared a culture based on
industry-sponsored information and the
word-of-mouth of customers, who would
discuss push-button transmissions and
hemi-head engines.
The General Motors “family” of vehicles
had real meaning, because the dealer
network and product features both
embodied the clear graduation from
Chevrolet to Cadillac.
Information content and physical content
overlapped neatly. Compared to today
there were few choices in vehicles, and
fewer choices in buying experiences
because images and objects were bound
together.
“Branding” is a very complex, multi-
sensory, phenomenon of emo~on and
logic, physical and mental processes. In
the old “bundled” world, all elements of
the auto environment were tightly linked
because of the simplicity of both physical
and sensory dimensions of the business.
There were few sources of imagery
(largely the factory), there were simple
physical embodiments of this imagery (the
car, the dealer, the advertisement). And
there was very little information outside
this tight bundle that could challenge the
bundle.
UNBUNDLING THE INFORMATION
CONTENT OF THE INDUSTRY
This bond was first shaken by the
emergence of a separate information
industry that was not controlled by car
maker or dealers. Enthusiast magazines
began to rate new models, and brought
information to the public about new
vehicle choices from Europe. The “safety
wars” of the 1960’s brought forth the
government and fledgling consumerism
organizations as providers of information
that often countered the claims made by
car companies in their advertising.
Remember the debate over whether
“safety sells” or not? Remember the
government safety hearings on TV, and
the detective GM sent after Ralph Nader?
In short order it became profitable to
provide independent information on cars
and on the car buying process. ~ A new
industry was born to provide consumers
with data they needed to shop better for
cars ....to get a more economic deal ....or to
provide for the safety of their families.
The subtle process was underway and
customers liked it.
UNBUNDLING THE PHYSICAL
AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCT LINE
This information unbundling was
accompanied by a physical unbundling of
product lines, or vehicle segments. More
vehicles (physical) became available to the
public, at the same time that new
acceptable customer thinking
(information) became available.
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of
market-wide product fragmentation was
represented by the VW Beetle. The Beetle
was a radically different car, but more
importantly, created a radically different
brand category by managing information
and product at the same time. The car
was different, but it rested on a successful
advertising campaign that made it “neat”
or “cool” for customers to see themselves
in a small, ugly, economical “bug”. Ugly
chic. And it doesn’t change every model
year. A new cuiture outside the tight
7 Commercial sector information services could earn
a good living. Public interest groups could get
funds to publicize their agenda.
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American bundle of Detroit factory-
dealer-customer. A very different brand,
based largely on a new information and
sensory environment surrounding the
different physical product.
More new brands came, expanding the
sensory and physical diversity established
by Triumph, MG, Mercedes. English
Fords. Renault Dauphines. Saabs---
radical “physical in forma tion’’---an
upside-down bathtub. Volvos----retro--- a
modem rendition of a 1940 Ford. New
information: front drive is good in the
snow--- our cars were built for bad
European roads---they last forever.
Advertising sensory images fit physical
information of driving (these cars really
were different from American cars. )
These European brand-fragmenters were
matched by new brands from Detroit:
Falcon, Corvair, Greenbriar, and a host of
muscle-car brand derivatives. Both
sensory information and physical product
got more complex.
But brand complexity did not stop with
collapsing industry-defined product
segments. Customers fragmented products
at an even deeper personal level.
Customizing and “hot rodding” brought
branded parts providers to customer
consciousness. Remember the “Hurst”
shifter, Hooker headers, Moon
hubcaps...’’branding” was brought to the
component level, largely through cultural
information flow among customers. A
Chevy 409 wasn’t really a proper one
until you had modified it to your taste.
You’d be embarrassed to drive a car unless
you at least put a set of fender skirts on it--
-really cool was a “continental k~t” spare
tire. At the very least you’d punch a few
holes in the muffler so it sounded like you
had installed “glass packs”.
Customers wanted brand control
themselves.
UNBUNDLING THE PHYSICAL
DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE
At first, this “diversifying brand bond
bundle” was a fragmented set of trends at
the retail end of the business. But during
the 60’s and 70’s, the power structure of
the entire industry system was changed by
successful dealers who began to establish
diversified dealer organizations. Customers
could learn the advantages of many brands
from independent information sources,
and they could buy different brands from
the same dealer operation who had
financial independence from the factory.
Dealers once thought it was important that
a Cadillac was the high end of the GM
brand family, and it mattered that they had
an Imperial waiting for customers who had
prospered beyond the P!ymouth level in
life ----because customers believed the
same thing, and dealers’ economic lives
depended upon fitting this brand clarity.
But with increasing diversity in the
product, retail, and information markets,
branding had become much more
complex. There were economic rewards
for following the new customer-driven
brand preferences--- and an increasingly
independent retail sector shifted to meet
the new cultural diversity in the
marketplace. The parents could have a
Ford, and the kid could get a Beetle ---or
vice versa. The Chevy owner might aspire
to a Mercedes. When the president of the
high school class drove to school in a bug-
eye Sprite... forget the Ford and Chevy ads,
the kids wanted a bug-eye.
Smart dealers wanted to provide customers
any option that fitted their cultural needs,
so they began to configure an industry
system that did not care about the 1950’s
logic of branding. Dealers became capital
pools that would buy and sell anything the
new market culture wanted.a
BY THE 1980’S, A COMPLETELY
UNBUNDLED INDUSTRY ARCHITECTURE
Notice the progression. Shifts in
information technology (independent data
sources and new images) allowed cultural
diversity in customer buying (get exactly
8 The ultimate influence of this shift is evident
today. Many people do not know that there are a
number of “car dealers” who are as economically
powerful as some imported car brands: they have
multi-billion dollar retail operations that are
entirely self-financed.
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what they need), accompanied by a shift
in physical dimensions of the industry
(more car types, more channels), all of
which ultimately shified the entire industry
structure.
This opened the way to completely new
methods of competition to those who
understood the equation. By using an
innovative service approach and careful
information management, Honda turned a
recall affecting several million rusty
fenders into a huge information windfall:
Honda changed the message from “our
cars can rust” to “we care about you and
the quality of your car after you buy it”,
and potentially offended owners spread
the positive word about the company.
They enlisted all elements of the auto
industry system, including information,
sensory, and physical to create a positive
cultural event, reinforcing the over all
brand. They did not simply hope “MC
Donalds -like” dealerships or some
advertising would somehow convey the
necessary message.
Market behavior of the 1960’s through
80s strongly suggests that customers who
had a variety of new information sources
and cars at their disposal, came to attach
“brand” feelings more to the specific
vehicle they were interested in plus a
number of cultural sensory factors
meaningful in their own lives (free no-rust
fenders, socially smart cars that didn’t
break down, etc.) --- and less to the factory
logic used to structure the physical nature
of the industry. This is often described as
“lack of brand loyalty”. But it is perhaps
more accurate to describe this
fundamental trend as “loyalty to the
consumer’s own choice of specijic vehicle
and its attributes, instead of loyalty to the
factory-dealer-customer bundle of the
1950’s”. This seemingly semantic
difference is important because it captures
the customer’s emerging behavior:
customers came to seek objective
information . . . which allowed them to
compare vehicle features outside of
corporate families.. which then allowed
them to select the closest match to their
needs, from among a wide variety of
vehicle “brands”, and then seek the most
pleasant way to buy that vehicle.
Therefore, customers appeared to care less
about the company logic of physical
distribution and retailing. They didn’t like
high pressure retail tactics, they no longer
sought vehicle variety within one corporate
brand family, so they began shopping
through whatever channel gave them their
choice of specific vehicle attributes.
Many car makers have never successfully
solved this problem. They lost brand
clarity in the retail channel and have
provided very confusing mixes of car type
and channel choice to the North American
customer.9
Over the years this “unbundling” ---of
industry structure and brand ingredients---
has only increased, and it became the
dominant format of automotive retailing m
the iNorth American market global ized. 1”
Importers, information providers,
information channels, and many other
players joined the prosperous and
diversifying North American market, M
entities beyond the direct control of
factories and traditional dealers.
NEW MEDIA OF THE 1990’S: STARTING
THE INFORMATION SYSTEM
UNBUNDLING FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY
The importance of the new media
revolution is that it is starting a second
generation of “information unbundling”
One dimension of the industry that did not
change radically during the past two
decades is the relationship among the core
traditional media players: the car
companies, the advertising industry, and
the “media pipe” industries (TV, radio,
9 GM, Chrysler, Nissan, and Mazda were most often
criticized for this in the popular press.
*“ During the early 1970’s, with the advent of
emissions and safety regulations, customers were no
longer able to customize their cars. A period of
relative homogeneity occurred. But it appears that
the basic human instinct never went away, and as
the US market opened to the world, customers
continued to demand product uniqueness. This has
been now supplied more by diverse car companies,
not from aftermarket customization, and should be
considered a basic tenet of global competition.
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print). Despite the complete
fragmentation of the product mix and
physical dealer infrastructure, the basic
media relationship remains as it was during
the 1960’s. Car companies send messages
to the public through the advertising world
and the large commercial media pipes.
The importance of the second information
revolution is that it will not only fragment
further the physical product and physical
distribution sectors, it will unbundle the
traditional media infrastmcture by shifting
it to user-controlled, two-way
communication processes.
Branding’s new focus
Why is “branding” so important in the
new media context? New media will cause
much greater variety of non-factory
processes: seeking information about the
car, developing a “culturally defined”
sense about the car, buying the car
through new channels, trading word-of-
mouth through new cultural networks, and
so on. In short, the collection of images,
feelings, and experiences that represent a
“brand” to a customer will come from a
much wider variety of sources outside the
control of the car companies.
The challenge to the car companies is to
create a “brand” that can survive dilution
from this new array of processes that
touch and influence customers---while at
the same time appealing to the consumer
need for personal uniqueness that was
man ifest in the ajlermarket customization
era. And they won’t be able to do this by
changing the tiles, mgs, and signs on the
dealerships . . ..or by changing TV
advertisements. The role of the traditional
dealer and advertising will * remain
important, but car companies must learn
how to exist in a much different
environment brought about by customer
driven new media.
It is too early to begin predicting the exact
consequences of these changes, but one
can distill strategic direction by
understanding the basic theme of the new
media and by picking out the key
“lessons” from automotive market history
as it collides with new media processes.
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THE GENERAL “POST
ASSEMBLY” AUTO THEME:
PUSH VERSUS PULL
Understanding new media can be very
complex. However, strategically, the main
point is simple. The new media allow
marketing, distribution , and retailing
processes to shift from a fundamentally
“push” process, to a fundamentally
“pull” process.
AFTER ASSEMBLY.. .. IT’S MOSTLY
“PUS H“
Despite a number of recent improvements,
the current auto distribution model is one
in which the factory “pushes” un-ordered
units into dealer stocks that average more
than 60 days’ supply of stock (it would
take 60 days at the current selling rate to
draw the stock to zero)ll. This is starkly
opposed to modem manufacturing “pull”
processes, in which parts are not made
until they are expressly needed by the next
upstream step in the production process.
Factories now often run with hours’
supply of stock, not anything approaching
60 days’ supply. If you want to be a
supplier to a car company these days, you
must be prepared to operate according to
some form of a “pull” system.
But if you are a car company, with limited
exceptions you operate a “push” system
with your dealers. Dealers must
guesstimate demand often months in
advance for the bulk of their orders, which
means they are ordering cars for stock
without any specific customers lined up to
buy those cars. This is not some diabolical
scheme cooked up by the car companies;
it is a fact of life based upon previously
inadequate information systems at the
distribution and retailing end of the
business, and poor connection to the
11 What is worse is that direct measurement at
dealers shows that the 60 day average is a
combination of many cars that sell in a few days,
balanced against many that stay in stock for more
than 120 days. The actual cars in stock are evidence
that the “push” is more wasteful than the averages
suggest.
complex customer buying process out in
the market population.
If information systems could specifi e.ractiv
when and where a particlilar customer
would show Up to buy an e.tacf/v -
configured vehicle, then distribution mo-st
assuredly \vould be based upon the “pull”
of this specific customer driven
information.
Likewise, the current media surrounding
this system are largely “push” systems---
“Let me tell you how great this car is’’---”
Let me give you some cash back to buy
the cars you don’t want to buy at the
current price”. While the systems m-e
staffed by very sensitive and tuned-in
people, the overall system direction is still
largely from the factory to the market. It
is not fundamentally geared to getting
granular information from the buying
public in real time and integrating it into
the production process. Advertising is not
a “kan ban” system.lz
This is where the new media systems come
into play. Given the fact that new media
are two-way, and touch users directly, the
systems have the power to discern exactly
when, where, what, and how customers will
buy. If producers and retailers construct
the right systems---ones that customers
like and use---they can enter the buying
process much earlier than they can now,
and they can work with a customer until
the actual point of sale of a particular car.
The economics of the current “front end
push systems” lay the foundation for the
benefits of new media pull systems.
“PUSH” COSTS TOO MUCH — FOR
EVERYONE
The economics of the current distribution
system show why new media can be so
powerful, and why it is so reasonable to
conclude that new media methods will
continue to expand relentlessly.
Our field research has been directed at
understanding the real-world economics of
12A km ban is a card that is passed from one station
in a plant down to its supplying stations, to “pull” a
batch of parts up from the supplying stations.
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current push distribution practices. We
have found that the averages used by most
top executives to understand the retail
situation are misleading at best. When
one spends time in the market with dealers,
it becomes clear that the current strategic
control systems are out-of-date compared
to industry at large, and are costing
everyone too much money — from
companies to customers.
‘{E” is a fairly typical demand pattern;
notice its regular steps of inventory age.
Model “G” is a high demand “mass
market” car — and here is where the
numbers get interesting in their detail.
Notice that much of the stock is about 7
days old — these cars are just off the
truck. Notice the next age step in the
profile --- about 1/3 the number of cars in
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Our most instructive finding is that the
industry is “drowning” in a stream that
averages only two-feet deep. It has been
common practice to assume that a 60-70
day supply of cars on hand in the retail
end of the business is an OK economic
measure. This assumes that the system will
make money, and customers will be
satisfied, if the (push) system carries about
two months supply of cars in ~etail --
optimizing customer choice and inventory
carrying costs.
We conducted an interesting project that
simply counted the age of individual cars
in a sample of dealer lots. Figure A is a
graph of the stock at one dealer lot --- a
fairly typical dealer. Each bar in the chart
is one car. The height of the bar is the
number of days that car has been on the
dealer lot. The cars are grouped by
model.
Model “D” are the dealer demos,
accounting for their high age. Model
P T
the five-week age
bracket. This says
that about 2/3 of
model G sell within
five weeks of their
delivery off the
truck. Those that
don’t sell in this
early period tend to
stay around for
awhile.
The crucial
discovery for us was
that the difference
between a fast
selling G car and a
slow seller wouid
often be only one
option or one
product feature (e.g.
manual windows. or
interior trim color). This means two
things:
. A small correction in information flow
would change stock profile
completely.
l Thousands of people in manufacturing
had worked very efficiently, to make
cars that were moving very inejjlcientlv
through the “front end” of the
industry. ”
At this dealer, the effect was even more
pronounced for the F and T models.
These cars were in very high demand — so
many deliveries didn’t even make it into
stock, they were sold to customers directly
off the truck. But notice the high average
stock age of these models. This is the
ultimate irony — a dealer has aging stock
13 ~j~ Is by “o me~s the fault of dealers or of any
single group in the system --- it is a system
effect that spans all manufacturing , distribution,
and retail.
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of a very “fast moving” car line. Again,
the differences between the “instant
sellers” and the “slow movers” was
usually one or two option codes.
OK . . ..SO what? Isn’t that what a
distribution system is supposed to do ---
smooth out the differences between
factory schedule and “fickle” customer
demand? As long as the averages are
around that 60 day standard number ---
many will tell us — the system should be
working OK.
But our next level of research was even
more surprising, in that it appears to
completely destroy the common notion
that people can make money and satisfy
customers with a 60 day supply of cars in
retail stock.
Our research design was simple. Activity
based costing (ABC) has proven very
useful in sorting out good from bad
practices in the manufacturing world.
What if we borrowed a simple ABC
technique and re-calculated the cost
structure at some retail locations to see
what would result?
On average (a dangerous term) most
dealers calculate departmental costs and
profits (new cars, used cars, service, etc.),
and they l~~k at average profits per
department.
Taking our “ABC” perspective, we said
“what happens if we charge costs to the
activisy causing the costs — stocking and
managing inventory”? So we devised a
simple method that allocates the cost of the
new car selling department to the cars in
inventory. In essence, we charge ,“per day
rent” to each car in stock. We figured this
made sense because it takes almost no
effort to sell a hot mover off the truck —
but it takes a lot more effort (sales time,
land, financing, taxes, cleaning,
bookkeeping, etc) to get a slow seller
‘4 Even on this basis, it is clear that many deaIers
make little money on new cars. Most dealers appear
to survive on used car sales and service and repair.
Long term capital appreciation often comes from
the commercial real estate they own, not from the
car business.
through a 120 day stock period into a
buyer’s hands.
Our first calculations literally shocked us.
A “typical” dealer lost any chance of
making money on some cars if they stayed
in stock for 30-40 days --- far shorter than
the “OK” industry standard of 60 days
supply. We assumed we had made a
mistake. But when we discussed these
calculations with savvy dealers, they in
essence said the numbers were correct, and
they even managed their businesses with
this in mind. 15 Figure B shows the results
of our method applied in three different
locations. We must urge caution in
looking at these numbers, because we have
looked at only a small fraction of
thousands of retail locations. But, we now
know the 60-dav number is certainly not a
proj?table industry standard for the new
car departments of most of the dealers we
have looked at in our preliminary work.
Figure B: Inventory Age Cuts Margins
Dramatically
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Since our early efforts, we have been
collecting a wider sample of data, and we
see that our early conclusions were
probably correct --- but that there is a
huge diversity in dealer management
processes. Some dealers have adopted
“Wal-Mart” style high velocity
15For example, by taking slow sellers out of retail
stock and putting them into subsidized leasing
programs to get some cash flowing in around the
unit --- instead of having it simply sit as a lump in
stock.
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techniques, which means they cut their per
unit costs well below national averages.
Other dealers explicitly “overstock”, but
compensate with very high profits
elsewhere, and they use their high stock
levels to become dominant regional
dealers. If you drive 75 miles to visit
them, they will almost certainly have the
car you want in stock. They have chosen
to re-arrange all the economic levers
available to them, to create a market
position that benefits their customers ~~d
gives them a durable strategic business.
In short, even our preliminary work, and
the work of many others, shows that the
current push system is not economic.
What struck us so hard in the field is how
truly expensive the current push system is
to everyone --- dealers, factories,
customers. The only groups appearing to
make money on the current system are the
capital sources who finance excess
inventories for dealers who can afford
them — but even this is probably a short-
range perspective.
Because the costs associated with the push
system are so large -- and because the
solutions rest largely upon changes in
information flow — it appears very logical
to observe that responsive new media
systems are going to relentlessly take over
the front end of the auto business, and link
it more economically to the manufacturing
end of the business. The exact pathway,
however is less clear,
“PULL” ISN’T ALWAYS EASY. .. BUT IT’S
INEVITABLE
On the surface, pull methods would seem
to be of great benefit to everyonel
However, as with most new technologies,
many current industry players feel
threatened by new potential. In this case it
is because new media appear to shift
control of the buying process to the buyer.
16 It is important to note that many dealers who
achieve this are multi-brand dealers. And/or, they
may have stretched the bounds of their franchise
contracts to their limits. It is important to note that
successful retailers often have to work outside the
systems conceived by even well-meaning factory
policies.
Most traditional sales training material
admonishes the sales person to ‘“keep
control” of the buying process: it assumes
control equals closure. This theme really
underpins the complex circus that happens
when you try to buy a car at many dealers.
They create a series of steps through which
the customer must move, often continuing
well after the “sales contract” is signed, in
order to keep regaining control of the
process in the event a customer “wins” a
particular step17” The strategic problem
with this is that most customers do not like
this dominant sales process, which has
damaged the overall popularity of the
current automotive distribution system.
The immediate problem for dealers, is that
this process is very expensive on a per car
basis”18
New Aledia Solutions — Bumpy Start But
High Payoff
New media is also subject to a number of
false starts, because the nature of the
technology allows people to quickly create
new methods that simply don’t work, like
crude kiosks in airports19---whlch
encourages threatened people to say, ““see,
we tried it and it didn’t work”.
Many will continue the traditional
methods. But, to the extent they do, they
17 One new age dealer compares this to the school
bully process. [f he tries to take your lunch money
in school, but t’aiis, he will accost you later on the
way home where he is more like to win when the
protection of school is absent.
[s our field rese~~h shows that it can often require 2-
3 hours of selling time for a negotiation. frequently
spread over many days. The process not only
creates ill-will, it costs real cash, and slows down
the “velocity” of the selling process, and the
supporting inventory pipeline.
19 one of the most absurd we have seen iS a kiosk
sitting in front of a duty free shop in an
international airport. The user must painfully page
through complex pages each showing one product,
and then insert a credit card to buy something that
must be picked up elsewhere. The customer could
simply walk in the shop, scan the shelves, and pick
out the product at the point of sale literally 30 feet
from the kiosk. The cycle time of waiting in line 1s
actually shorter than paging through the kiosk.
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also create more room for innovators who
will ultimately change the system.
Customer dissatisfaction is key to the
success of Saturn and other innovators.
Innovative processes, like ones used by
Saturn, “give up” control to the customer,
in order to gain a larger strategic corporate
control over its own destiny. By allowing
customers to do what they want during the
shopping and selling process, the
innovators ensure they get more accurate
demand information, and a more
motivated long term customer base, thus
keeping ultimate strategic control over
their long term corporate positioning.
“Pull” is good in this innovative
environment. “Pull” allows a
manufacturing organization much more
control over its destiny by providing
undiluted market signals to reach all levels
of the supply chain. This is the essential
lesson of the new media.
Unfortunately, in most large economic
systems, it takes time for market shifts to
be perceived by people who run the
existing system. And the conversion from
push methods to pull methods forces assets
embedded in “slow sellers” to come
under severe rzressure. In this case. the
new potentials will
existing jobs of many
in some of the
organizations, shifting
to new individuals.
also threaten’ the
powerful managers
world’s largest
those job functions
Perhaps the greatest power struggle will
occur when the new distribution systems
demonstrate that some models are not
selling because they are simply not
wanted. In this case, the power of the
market will not be diluted by gmassive
“customer incentives” that tend to blur
decision making responsibility. Now the
costs of slow selling models are buried in
the complex dealer network or “sloshed”
across the whole auto making system. No
one is given direct responsibility or cross
functional authority to cut these costs.
With pull retail systems, incentive costs will
be directly linked to poor vehicle
programs, directly challenging the
investment in those programs, and the
individuals who are associated with those
programs. zo The automakers who can
solve this inevitable cultural clash will be
the ones who prosper in the next century;
the winners will be those who can “pull”
all they way from the customer to the iron
mine.z’
“Pull” is really a deep social trend: every
retail product in the world is moving to
“pull” from “push”. Auto
manufacturing has survived by converting
to “pull”, and automotive distribution will
likewise relentlessly move toward “pull”.
To understand how new media systems will
reinforce the pull trend, let’s examine the
systems already in place. They represent
tremendous raw material for the new
media systems, making sophisticated
market facing systems easier than many
might think.
20 [n other retail industries, like consumer
electronics and computers, who sell through direct
“pull” systems----the Wal Marts of the world----bad
products are not made for long, because retailers
simply won’t stock them. In a true “pull” system,
the retailer ---not the manufacturer---selects the
ultimate product portfolio. This ultimately forces
the product development function to get very close
to the retail system, which is where marry argue it
should be.
21 one can look to the consumer electronics
business for models here. ‘t%is business is “pull”
over much more of the industrial chain, and
successful companies are those, like HP, Motorola,
and Sony, who can fit product development and
manufacturingcycles to market cycles. As product
cycles shorten in the auto business, it is
increasingly looking like the electronics business.
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WHAT IS THE “AUTOMOTIVE
INFORMATION SPACE”
Software and communications developers
often think in terms of “environments”,
loose aggregations of systems and
technologies that surround a particular set
of business processes or human behaviors.
The environment surrounding the
automotive industry contains many
existing systems that can fuel the new
media growth. Figure 2 displays a
summary of the traditional automotive
information environment, including almost
the entire value chain from component
production through sale and use of the
Paralleling the production oriented
systems, and the financial control systems
are rapidly evolving product development
systems, most popularly thought of as
Computer Aided Design (CAD). In most
cases these systems are entirely focused on
engineering and production, with little
connection to the “front end” or
customer facing end of the business, An
important detail to remember is that these
systems almost always contain ‘“hooks”
that can connect them to other forms of
data outside the production find
engineering realm.22
DISTRIBUTION ORIENTED SYSTEMS
At the front end of the auto producing
chain are systems designed to process
orders and control stock
Figure 2: Auto Market “Space” : Old Information Technology Concepi
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shipments and distribution
logistics: well-developed
systems, containing
considerable data base
potentials. However, owing
largely to cultural ~nd
corporate organizational
factors, we find that their full
capabilities are rarely used
in practice. For example,
inventory control systems
can track the actual
movement of individual
units, and incorporate data
about the costs of shipping,
holding, and selling
individual units .23 But these
capabilities are rarely used
to decipher the details of
stock movement and cost in
the retail part of the chain.
vehicle. Most often, the output ;f these systems is
Notice that there are already @a large
used in broad forecasting and planning
mode.
number of electronically based systems
and methods in use.
22 For ~xample, CAD systems contain the ability ‘0
PRODUCTION ORIENTED SYSTEMS incorporate “features”. These are intended to be
standard engineering items such as “holes” or
“shapes”, but these software hooks can be used to
Systems have been well developed in the
production and component supply chain
for years. These systems include the
electronic data interchange processes that
link car company functions and link
suppliers in a chain of production. They
also include systems that manage and
measure manufacturing processes.
incorporate other data items like customer
requirements and market price limits. Activity
Based Costing Systems cart be modified to include
similar market-derived limits and constraints.
23 Our research shows they could be used to create
“activity based cost” systems Like those in
manufacturing.
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Beyond the factory gate are many
“pipes” and “applications” that seek to
link dealers to the factory, and to link
portions of the retail chain to each other.
Some are factory systems, often conceived
according to the vision and business
targets of the factory. Many are derived
by third party systems providers who sell
independently to both car companies and
dealers. Still others, usually at the retail
end of the chain, are created by local
application developers who build systems
to track sales prospects, manage service
parts and warranty claims, or control the
finances of a dealership.
Related information technology systems
are developed by the transport companies
who carry vehicles to and between dealers.
Some of the most modem versions of
these allow “Federal Express” style
tracking of shipments in transit.
One strategic characteristic of all these
factory and post-factory systems is that
they have usually been developed to solve
some local or functional problem, and
therefore the systems are quite fragmented
and not created to link with each other.
Their other strategic characteristic is that
no matter how well-connected they may
be, they stop at the showroom door. They
are industrial systems, not market-linked
systems.
“NON-SYSTEM SYSTEMS”
The remainder of the industry-sponsored
automotive information environment is
made up of a wide variety of largely
traditional communications m$dia and
“sneakerware” ....the interaction of human
beings without automated systems
involvement.
Most massive of these are the advertising
and promotion environments surrounding
the auto business. While this is a multi-
billion dollar industry unto itself, with
great complexity, it can be boiled down to
a two level communication environment.
At the national level is the array of
company sponsored advertising and
promotion, the TV and print ads we are all
used to.24 At the local level is a wide array
of dealer-driven advertising and
communication, largely designed to
capture customers for individual
showrooms.
Not often thought of as “information
technology” is the good old “snail mail”
postal service, used by both the national
and local organizations to reach out to
customers directly. While it does not travel
electronically, this is clearly a large part of
the information environment.
Also included in this area of the
environment is the “publishing” part of
the information environment. This would
include the various consumer oriented
publications, the enthusiast press,
government publications, trade press, and
a host of other information sources.
While the information processes of the
communications sector are highly refined,
many are extraordinarily expensive
compared to emerging systems. National
advertising runs into the billions of dollars
yearly. Direct mail campaigns and
newspaper fliers easily cost several dollars
per quality response. Urban car dealers
often spend thousands of dollars per week
on local advertising.
Most estimates suggest that in North
America, the cost of each car includes
between $500 and $1000 of advertising,
promotion, and communication . . . ..not
including the financial incentives used to
move slow selling vehicles25. This
suggests an annual communication bill of
about $10 billion or more for the North
American auto business. As a point of
comparison, all the glass in these cars costs
around $3-4 billion per year, tires might
be $3-5 billion per year, auto sound
systems perhaps $7-9 billion. There are
many component suppliers who would like
just a fraction of the money spent on
24 Also included in [his array are outdoor
advertising, and a host of promotional products like
T-shirts that are designed to reinforce the broad
information content of the auto business.
25 Svcial promotlons can double this. The amount
obviously varies by volume of sales and popularity
of vehlc[e.
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advertising and communication
“information technologies”.
The above forms of media and
information technologies are almost
exclusively “push” technologies. That is,
they push a message from the factory,
dealer, or information content provider to
the customer. In the traditional
information environment, the only forms
of media that reach the home are these
push format technologies. To the outside
observer, the corporate culture that pushes
production volume into field stocks is also
calibrated to push information messages
out to the marketplace.zt Very little of this
traditional environment is interactive.
In truth, there is an interactive portion of
the traditional information environment.
This is perhaps most easily characterized
as “market research”. Car companies
have very sophisticated means to analyze
demographic profiles of markets and
customers, and they conduct a wide variety
of “clinics” to test product features. The
main problem with these interactive
methods is that they are indirect and quite
expensive. They are indirect, because they
work from indirect survey samples of
shoppers and buyers and, they are
expensive in that it costs millions of dollars
to get enough depth and sample sizes large
enough to get the kind of predictive
accuracy to represent a direct connection
to the buying public.z’
Historic interactive information
technologies are also notoriously slow. It
takes months to prepare good surveys,
months to digest the results, and often at
least months to argue over the meaning of
the output. If you’ re trying to fut a 60
26 While marketing types will often characterize
some of the promotional efforts as “pull’’----
designed to get the customer to “pull” a car through
the pipeline by getting excited about it and then
going to ask a dealer for it---the information
process is still very much push: the message is
pushed out there into the environment toward the
customer.
Z7 Single focus groups, involving say a dozen
customers can easily cost tens of thousands of
dollars. Large scale surveys, with phone follow-up
can run into the millions of dollars.
day supply of inventory, you need
faster market information systems.
CUSTOMER CONTROLLED
“INFORMATION SYSTEMS”
much
Beyond the industry-sponsored portion of
the information environment is a massive,
crucial, and largely overlooked
“information system’’ ..,. the word-of-mouth
communication among more than 100
million vehicle owners, or more than 200
million passengers. Active car shoppers
seek information wherever they can get it
as they try to narrow down their decisions.
But, even beyond active shoppers, it is
difficult to envision a cocktail party or
social gathering without some discussion
of cars in the crowd.
Figure 3: New TWO-WAY Technologies Emerge
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The mam attribute of word-of-mouth
information is that it is often more credible
than industry sponsored promotion.zs
Even if it is objectively incorrect, it may
have more weight than corporate
communications because it carries social
content, and people often care what others
think about the car they own. Another
characteristic of word-of-mouth dialogue
2!3Recent typical survey resuits. 63% say advice
from friend or relative stimulates interest to buy.
Only 25% for TV, 15% for newspaper ads.
Yankelovich survey. Wall Street Journal, October
17, 1995
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is that it can reveal very direct information
about buyers’ intention to purchase,
desired product features, or other pertinent
information.
We have tried to indicate some dimensions
of the word-of-mouth information sector
in Figure 2 by the shaded areas marked
“buyers” and “shoppers”. Each year
there are about 15 million vehicle buyers
in the North American market. But most
market research indicates that for every
active buyer there is at least one person
“advance shoppin
within months!; ‘or~~e;~~~r~a~~~
circulating in this group could be very
useful for the car industry system, in that it
would help plan production, feature mix,
and buying method or location.
If there was a practical way to capture the
billions of informal information
transactions each year among the
population at large, it would be much
easier to run the huge industrial systems
that produce and deliver cars. Until now,
this was an unthinkable ideal.
But the world is changing, and the
impossible may soon become the practical.
Figure 3 shows the addition of new media
and new information technologies to the
auto information environment,
29 “Intention to buy” data are notoriously soft and
variable, but simple analysis of the overall buying
cycle suggests these rough estimates are accurate.
INNOVATION IN THE CURRENT
AUTO INDUSTRY “SPACE”
So.. the automotive information space is
littered with latent systems, waiting to be
connected by innovative people and
organizations, With the intemet revolutlon
of the mid- 1990’s, this is exactly what is
happening. Following these innovations is
like trying to keep track of nuclear
explosion, but the main categories and
prime innovators point the way, The most
important innovation is the unbridled
spread of a new information technology
architecture — an open architecture
spawned by the intemet vision.
OPEN INTERACTIVE ARCHITECTURE
INSTALLED IN CUSTOMER SPACE
Physics teachers often describe u situation
in which a lake has been cooled to a
temperature just below freezing. If one
drops a pebble into the water, the lake will
suddenly turn to ice. Something very
similar has just happened in the auto
information environment. In one stroke,
new on-line, intern et, and related
information technologies are exploding
around smart boxes in the home, This has
several crucial strategic meanings.
l One, interactive communication
potential has just been installed in a
portion of the information
environment where it did not exist
before . ..out there in the market
population.
. Two, this technology allows links to
every other portion of the automotive
information environment, without
exception.
Shortly, the information environment will
have the ability to directly tap into the
word-of-mouth segment, and into the very
early stages of the shopping process
among customers. And, the information
traded in this sector of the environment
will be exchangeable with even the most
distant portion of the system, deep in
component suppliers’ factories.
The same style of “open architecture”
technology that is a novel wave in the
home can be equally well applied to all of
the other portions of the information
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system: in the dealership, on the trucks
carrying cars, in the assembly plant and
car maker offices, throughout the
component supply chain, and at all stages
of the current communications industry.
The nature of the new software is that it
uses very simple, easily written “middle
ware” to connect data bases that
previously could not be connected.30
Many have likened the new “internet”
technologies to the invention of the
printing press, when human
communication moved from word of
mouth and singly-scribed pages, to mass
produced information processing. It
actually might be more like the “multi
media” revolution of the later 1800’s in
which movies brought new dimensions to
reliable human communication. And, the
information shift represented by
ubiquitous interactive technology also
contains elements of the transportation
revolution that brought us the car in the
first place, and which revolutionized the
industrial revolution.
However one characterizes the
phenomenon, it certainly has deep
industrial ramifications. Let’s review some
of the actual innovations taking place, then
examine their implications for the auto
industry of the future ....one which can
now become truly “market facing’’ ....one
in which the “push” front end of the
value chain can become truly “pull”.
There is a logic to our review. The major
innovations are happening within the
customer space. One step up the industry
chain are innovations in the showroom,
and then in the distribution area. At the
next level, these market-facing innovations
will spawn changes in manufacturing and
vehicle design methods. Our purpose here
is to chow how changing customer
behavior, simultaneously allowed and
supported by new media will soon link all
innovations in the chain.
30 Software professionals will recognize this as an
oversimplification. But it is true, that “internet
style” software can link disparate data bases as long
as certain keys are laid on top of them. The data
bases are not integrated they are linked via specific
questions.
CUSTOMER FACING INNOVATIONS
On Line Access
The basic change is massive growth and
flexibility in on-line access technologies.
On-line service companies like Prodigy,
CompuServe, and America On Line (AOL)
have been around for years, however for
reasons not yet fully explained, they have
achieved huge growth in the past two
years. There have always been
automotive data and chat categories on
these services, but owing to the relatively
low penetration of the services themselves,
and to the fact that these proprietary
systems were self contained and not linked
to the rest of the automotive information
environment, they did not represent a
powerful force.
The pebble in this nearly frozen pond was
the popularization of the internet, which
has forever broken the boundaries of the
proprietary networks. In late 1994, the
“in a box” kits allowed non-UNIX folks
to ply the net, which provoked more nets
to join the net, which provoked more
people to join the nets, which provoked
high speed modems to become cheaper,
which made it more fun to surf the net,
which brought easier software to the net,
which provoked more people to join the
net ......and so on ....... Because the intemet
is like the wide open prairie compared to
the tight alleys of the proprietary networks,
users have forever rejected being cooped
up between data walls. America On Line,
Prodigy, CompuServe and others have
been forced to join the net, which means
even their private networks are now
linkable to all aspects of the information
environment. In less than a year, human
contact with the tens of millions of
installed computers was changed forever.
Dealernet
One of the first major automotive
applications to make use of this new
connectability was Dealernet. To
oversimplify, Dealemet was a software
application that dealers could install on
their existing (cheap) PC’s which would
create an intemet txesence for them, link
them to everyone- else
chain, link them to the
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in the Dealemet
central Dealemet
servers that performed certain services for
them, and simultaneously open them and
link them to everything and everyone else
on the net. Now it just turned out that for
reasons mentioned earlier in this article
(customer information seeking, and auto
as an information intensive product), this
service began to act like a huge lightning
rod that attracted millions of people
searching the new environment for things
automotive.
Each dealer who was on the service could
tell millions of people who they were, and
could begin to let customers interact with
them electronically. Although the product
is still in its roll-out and development
stage, the services it allows are instructive.
If a dealer so chooses, he/she can not only
provide product information, buying
information, and location information to
remote potential customers, the dealer
could allow customers to engage the
service department, the parts department,
and any other function in the dealership.
In its ultimate rendition, customers can
arrange service appointments, and can get
all kinds of questions answered without
having to travel over to the dealership, or
catch someone live on the phone. (“Non-
simultaneous dialogue” is a big feature of
new media systems, which saves both
dialogues time and money).
In addition, owing to the combined
architecture of Dealemet and the intemet,
customers could access dealers, car
producers, other car information sites ....in
short a whole range of information sources
that were hard to get to beforehand.
And the dealer could do all this for several
hundred dollars per month. De~lers can
now get responsive classified advertising,
with dialogue and specific customer
information, for pennies instead of
thousands of dollars. Customers could
interact with dealers in the security of their
own home, instead of the negotiating
environment of the showroom.
Dealernet is not “the” answer to the
information explosion, and there are a
number of worthy competitors appearing
as this article is written, but in one fell
swoop it provided the new paradigm for
dealer relations with customers. Along
with others, it created the 1990’s version
of the factory-dealer-customer bundle.
Unlike the bundle of the 1950’s, this
bundle is user controlled, rewards accurate
credible information, and allows maximum
flexibility for all parties in the bundle.
Dealemet, and its sure-to-come colleagues
have provided a method to improve and
inform all that “pre-buying tire kicking”
that customers have been doing. And it
allows prescient dealers cheap effective
ways to redefine dealer operations in a
truly customer driven way.
Other nets
About the same time that Dealemet rose to
public prominence, other forms of auto
related “nets” appeared.
Some car producers quickly provided
dealer locators on the internet.3 1
Customers can now instantly see all the
dealers in their area. This has always been
available on paper, but now the speed and
ease of access have been increased
dramatically (Try asking a dealer for the
company-provided booklet of all his
competitors in the area). Even this
innocuous “advertising” move has some
hidden implications. For example, in the
(quite common) circumstance a buyer did
not know how many dealers there were
near him, he/she now has a ready list of
dealers to search and negotiate with.32 If
the slightly distant dealers are “on the
net,” they suddenly have extended their
geographical market reach. The chickens
and eggs add up again. In a free market
driven by customers it will not be long
before all players will be working to a new
standard. The irony is that companies will
have to provide this simple information in
order to remain of service to customers,
and given the stakes facing customers, they
31 This has changed several times already. The
simple service has proven surprisingly “poiit]cal”
because it gets at the heart of who controls
retailing.
32 Don’ t underestimate this. Yellow Pages in their
paper form rarely show all the make dealers in an
urban area. On-line locators easily display more
dealers than one finds in each local edition of the
Yellow pages. Market research clearly shows price
sensitive buyers will travel far to get a better deal.
@MARTIN L. ~ERSON 1995, 199??41-L RIGHTS RESERVED.
will always use even simple information to
their increased advantage.33
In parallel, groups of dealers (the “auto
mile” folks) banded together to list
themselves on the net. If the factory-
created listings don’ t provoke the holdouts
to get on board, competitive dealers will.
Then came a major step ....stock locators
on the net. Most dealers would be
financially hard pressed to list each and
every car they had in stock in expensive
classified advertising. But on the net it
might cost a dealer a total of $29 per
month to list every item he holds. So
some did. And some visionary local
dealer associations or listing services
erupted with the same idea.
And if it worked for new cars, why won’ t it
work for used ones? So more listings
cropped up. And, it costs a private owner
about $35 to list his car in the local
newspaper. Let’s see .....it costs about $30
dollars per month to rent a web site with
10 megabytes of space (easily several
hundred pages of information), and there
are all those people paying newspapers
$35 per listing. .... So intemet classified
are emerging, at much better than
newsprint economics.
And around the country dealers are
regularly making twice the profit on a
used car that they make on a new car. So
they are increasing the volume of used
cars they are selling (some are now selling
750 to 1000 per month). So it gets
tougher to find used cars. “Hmmm. .... I
can make several thousand dollars on a
used car and it costs me much less to
transport it from someplace arqund the
country.” So used car buying services are
hitting the net.
And dealers began to realize the net could
extend their geographical reach. This is
good. So they signed up with the
emerging selling services that were
33 As we write, some dealers are resisting this
factory-provided locator service. This is the old
“control the customer -
model”, and it is sure to
information environment.
limit the information
lose out in the modem
capturing lists of potential buyers on the
net.
Changes in Customer Behavior
Let’s shift gears here a moment before
describing systems innovation higher up
the chain. Simply the changes we have
described so far are allowing and
prompting very different customer
behaviors, that will affect the industry-
sponsored innovations farther up the
indust~ chain.
Let’s take a look at some of this new
customer behavior, and its first influences
on the industry system.
Picture yourself as a buying customer.
It’s raining. Like millions of others you
know buying a car is a negotiating process,
but you’re not up for tire kicking and
dealing with salespeople in the rain. So
you hit the net. You point and click to
open your connection. You point and
click to open your browser and find a net
search program. You punch in the word
“automobile” and click your mouse.
You suddenly have several hundred
listings on your screen. with some more
points and clicks you find some of the
services most relevant to your buying
interests. (You might have also clicked on
the “Hummer” symbol on the Dealernet
brand listing page just for fun, as have
thousands of others, but you move on to
your brand territory.)
You’ ve seen your desired cars on the road,
and looked at them in parking lots.
Maybe you even drove one owned by a
friend. Or maybe you owned one like it in
the past. You already have some pre-
stored sensory input on the vehicle. Now
you check out what the manufacturers say
about their cars. Dig into several of the
on-line consumer data bases to check
crash tests, reliability, fuel costs, etc. The
enthusiast press on line tells you about
speed and fun to drive stuff.
Next stop, the user groups in which people
talk about their car winners and losers, and
in which service recalls, hidden warranties,
and all kinds of other information are
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Figure 4: Examples of user dialogue in the new media
A series of almost 200 messages on two very popularSporlUtilltyVehicles:
“’[f you buy an “A’ you will always be m four wheel drive and II turns really well,
In the ‘B’ if you are in 4 wheel drive. It is VERY difficult to make sharp turns.”
“My fmrnly has driven an ‘A” since 19S9 and [ can proudly say it is [he best vchlcle
we have ever owned. We hi[ a deer w(th tt and only got a small crack in the hood
We purchased a “B’ In 1993 and it IS a nice vehicle. ..a little slow .md ![ PLOWS
through comers compared to the ‘A’ ....]t M not all that fisn to drive.”
A series of discussions on an opparertt problem with the “B” vehicle
“On a ’95 B I am having trouble with the torque converter ( 1500 males) that the
dealer has been unsuccessful in fixing so far.” (Next commenter) “1 have had the
same problem at 3000 miles .. ..had to replace the torque converter ....no more
problems for 7000 miles.”’(Next commenter)‘“.....dropped a gear at 1000 miles,,..”
[Nextcrsmmenter)“...bad conwxter.,did not let me get Into 4 wheel drive...” (Nex[
:ommenter) “.. .no longer engaged forward or reverse at 13.000 miles...” (Next
;ommenter) “ ...just had transmission replaced at 10.000 miles...” (Next
:ommenter) .....’’anyone got an address at the ( B auto cumpany) so we can tell them
we’re not going to put up with this anymore and will be buytng foreign cm”?....”
Some chscussion on m car line that spends nmllions to uivmtise IIS good customer
:ervlce image:
‘.. If you are a ‘X’ nwner and wwrt to Join us In our quest to rel~y how poor X
:ustomer service is, please e-marl us at (address)...’” (Next commenter) ““....my X
Jealer has been great (cites example )...” (Next comrnenter) “ ..1 had ( long
problem descriptmn) .....anyone else had the swne problem on [he X?.....”’ (Next
:ommenter) “... yes, we had the same problem at 15.000 miles (long description
lbout how dealer told him the problem was ]n the materml used to make the
:ompcrnent and that everyone was waning for the factory to fix i[, but the factory
was not coming out with a new part yet) ....it seems we me now stuck with the
problem .....” The thread continues with more comments on smular problems.
For the same X model, one user, apparently in a remote area, WM unable to start his
:X on a cold day, so he posted a request for help to the mternet. Thethreadof
;ommenters:ave h!m usehd suggestions. Then the original owner came back on to
say that his dealer WM not able to help him over the phone. but the tow tmck driver
who did start the car con fh-rned the advice he had gotten from other owners over
he Intemet.
Discussion on a very popular new sporty sedan:
‘...our ’96 D started to have a ‘moaning’ sound from the rear brakes. Our ‘service
Jdvisor’ SJYS It’s a problem they’ve seen in three other D’s ....that (D auto company
knows about the problem. but doesn’t have a fix for it...”
listed on the vehicles you’re thinking
about. (See Figure 4)
You find some dealers near yo~. You
check some private classifleds to see what
others are asking for your type of trade-in.
You find the several services listing dealer
invoice on the cars you are looking for.
You might even get a quote from a buyer
on your trade, but if not you can still find
“blue book” values on your used car.
Figure 4 shows some selected samples of
the hundreds of discussions users can find
using simple point-and-click searches.
After about 30 minutes, you’ ve got the
kind of information it might have taken
days to get in the past, and you
have some information you never
would have seen the last time you
bought a car. And you’ve got a
pretty darn good idea of what
you want.
And you have some dealer e-mail
addresses.
Are you going to visit a dealer
now? Maybe. But since it’s free
you might just e-mail some of
these dealers with your interests
and then go watch football while
it continues to rain. Increasingly,
these dealers might e-mail you
back. And since there’s not
much to lose, you might try
negotiating some prices based
upon what you found on the net.
Picture the dealer. Someone just
expressed e-mail interest in a car,
and instead of costing him the
sales time of a salesperson and a
sales manager, this expression of
interest cost him just about
nothing. Will he answer the e-
mail? Ever see a sales person
turn down a lead? Will he
negotiate? Is he going to risk
losing you to another dealer?
Most likely dealers will try to
make something of the lead, and
that means engaging in the
negotiation. As more dealers go
electronic, the system will
equilibrate around the new
customer standard.
In truth, not much has changed in this
scenario, compared to the old days, except
the speed and quality of information has
jumped dramatically, and the customer has
gained more control. Dealers may not like
this too much, but in truth they were
having to behave this way even in the old
showroom transactions. And in this
scenario, the costs of the selling process
can drop dramatically, leaving the dealer
more profit at a given discounted price.
@Mm L. ANDERSON 1995, 199?’kL RIG14TS RESERVED.
Figure 5: Emerging Networks Create Many Systems and Servicee
Suppliers Forecast Repairs Conduct Product Clinics On-line
d- Buy Cars On-line,. -_,>;g@
.. ~.w On-1ine Finance
.- !!!!?!!
. .
Factory Tests Colors On-l ine,.; Local Dealer
. ... CATV -
Internet
Dealers Start Own Stock Transfer
Links
Local Dialogue With Sales People
Customers Search Inventory
Electonic Used Car Auctions
Owners Schedule Senfice On-line
As the buyer, you will probably want to
test drive the car 34‘ and you might have to
still visit some other dealers to really
negotiate. But if you do, you will do so
with the information and the “practice”
from your net sessions backing you up.
On balance, the new capabilities can
provide benefits to all involved, except to
those (like newspaper classified) that were
P,
getting pretty hi h rents on the old less
efficient process.
Is it really too extreme to say that in one
move, the entire front end of the car
buying process has been revolutionized?
Disagree? What about when this capability
hits the interactive cable TV in the next
year or two? Remember Home Shopping
Club? Think about Land’s End, LL Bean,
PC Connection, and a host of others.
a
M It is often SsSumed that test drives are Part of the
process. However, our dealer interviews reveai a
number of dealers who say a test drive is not
mandatory for every customer. One participant in
the lCDP, who is one of the largest car dealers in
Europe, recently noted that fewer than 10 percent of
his customers take a test drive before buying the car.
35 Al~hougbitis hardly a SClet’ItlfiC study. this
author sold a large quantity of unused sporting
equipment in one week over the internet. This
material had been iisted frequently in classified
advertising and locat paper bulletin boards for two
years previously.
Let’s see how the
changed customer
behavior links to
current and
pending
innovations further
“upstream” in the
auto industry. Our
point here is to
show how the basic
customer behavior
changes allow
many things up
the chain to be
linked in “new
paradigm” ways.
(Figure 5
illustrates some
emerging linked
services)
POINT OF SALES INNOVATION
Vehicle Specification Systems:
Tremendous Two- Way Potential
One of the key problems in executing a
sale, especially if it is for a car not in stock
(car ordered from factory or from another
dealer’s stock), is getting the customer the
exact configuration of vehicle he/she
wants. Even though options packages
have been simplified in most vehicles, it is
quite typical for a customer to ask things
like “can I get the towing package with
the sport interior?” If a customer wants a
feature, the sales person really needs to
know if it’s a possible combination, and
human memory just isn’t good enough.
Therefore, a major effort is underway to
have all the possible vehicle specification
combinations easily accessible on line at
the point of sale. In some cases, this helps
“objectify” the relationship between
salesperson and buyer: the salesperson
does not need to rest on personal
credibility (or faulty memory) and the
customer feels he/she is getting straight
information. This innovation also helps
dealers with costly staff training. The sales
person merely needs to be trained how to
use the computer, not how to memorize
complex and changing
.,-. . .
product
specmcauons.
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The intended use of this technology is
good. But its ultimate potential is huge.
What if the spec-ing system could be made
more accessible to that front end intemet
buying environment mentioned above?
There are risks, but in an interactive
environment, the same program that is
used in the show room in single
transactions, could be extended to capture
detail on customer feature preferences
very early in the buying cycle. Without
much imagination, one can see that
connecting this “industrial” system to the
“market” systems could have very
powerful results.
Right now literally millions of customers
express preferences in showrooms, and
these data are never captured. When a
customer says “can I get the towing
package?” he/she is conveying a specific
feature interest. What if millions of these
could be captured through a mirror use of
the spec-ing programs? With such large
samples, trends and intentions of actual
buyers could be recorded and interpreted
in real time. Compare the cost of this
transaction to the cost of setting up a much
less direct and complex survey response.
There’s an old joke about how the
government game wardens count the
number of antelope in a moving herd----
they count the number of legs and then
divide by four. That’s current market
research compared to capturing real time
data in the showroom, or even earlier in
the buying process.
Sales Desk Top Links Market to
Industil Systems
Another innovation under develo~ment is
often called the “sales desk top
interface”. Picture a simple touch screen
computer on the sales persons desk, with a
number of buttons on it. A customer
walks in saying he saw something on the
net. Push the “intemet” button and
explore the net with the customer. No
damage to sales credibility: accurate and
honest transaction on both sides.
It’s raining, so people are sending you e-
mail trying to negotiate with you. Push
the e-mail button and you can see how
many buyers are out there (and what your
earnings for the day might be if you
successfully negotiate with them). Or,
because it’s raining and no one is visiting
your lot, you call up your regional
customer data base and send people a
friendly contact message that is not
anywhere near as intrusive as one of those
“hi how are you doing” phone calls.
Another customer asks the “towing
package” question, so you push the spec-
ing button and get the answer. Yet another
calls to know when his special order is
coming in; you punch “orders” and get a
direct link to those information pipes at
the factory or the transport company.
Another piece in the new media puzzle fits
into place. Sales desk systems can easily
smooth customer relations, and provide
one more bridge to the churning market.
Connectivity is good. Speed is helpful.
And costs can be reduced if the new
systems are designed and used well.
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS CHANGE TO
MEET MARKETS
One step up the line, in the distribution
portion of the business, other major shifts
are taking place. Perhaps most well-
known in the car business is the European
shift away from dealer inventory storage to
regional “stocking pools”. Although the
details of this are complex, the strategic
view is straightforward. In the old system,
dealers ordered cars from the factory both
for waiting customers and for their
inventories, or stocks. This meant each car
produced was identified with a specific
dealer and not available to most other
dealers in the system. Even if another
dealer had a waiting customer, and you did
not, he could not access your car in the
pipeline. When a customer walked, the
dealer could only draw upon his units, in
stock or on order---typically 250 units for
an “average” dealer.
In the new system, the units in the pipeline
are not identified with a specific dealer
unless a customer there has put up money
for the car. Dealers can now draw from
the whole national pipeline. The math is
extremely simple. Each dealer has not just
@ ~TIN L. ANDERSON 1995, 1998hL RIGHTS RESERVED.
250 units “on call”, he can have several
thousand units available (in the old system
they would have been “owned” by other
dealers). This dramatically increases the
probability that a dealer can quickly and
exactly match each customer’s need to a
unit in the pipeline. So far the result has
been to make the customer end of the
business behave much more like a custom-
order system , but it simultaneously makes
the demands on the factory smooth out --
they are getting much clearer information
from the market, undiluted by the
confusing effects of dealer-held stock.36
The main point: this only required a small
change in the existing information system,
to create a whole new industry capability.
The dealer ID was removed from the
equation~, and the whole system got
simpler.
While there is hot debate among auto
companies as to whether this exact system
will work for them, the overall economics
argue strongly that some version of this
information architecture change will be
undertaken by almost everyone over time.
Now, what happens when you combine this
much more reflexive distribution system,
with the new information transaction
potential of the front end innovations
discussed above?
It seems exceedingly logical that if you
improve the speed and quality of
information in the market and sales
portion of the business, and you have a
distribution system that responds well even
to poor information, then you have a
winning combination with good
information. Given that such ~mbined
systems can improve costs by perhaps tens
of billions of dollars, it seems safe to bet
that market forces and good business sense
will use emerging improvements in the
information environment to create very
effective distribution systems. If spec-ing
36See ICDP working paper series.
37 The amount of cultural change required to
implement this is actually tremendous. But the
basic seem change is so simple and elegant that it is
much more likely to ease the cultural problems
overall,
and shopping systems can be ported to
distribution pooling, the combination can
only be an improvement.
Used Vehicle Markets: More Demand for
Linked Systems
YOU as the customer, may easily be
deciding between a new car and a newly
used car. And in most cases your
purchase decision will involve getting rid
of your old car. This means your “rainy
day” shopping behavior can connect to
one of the major industry innovations, the
professionalization of the used car
industry.
The economic drivers are in place. Used
cars are more profitable than new, and
more economical for many buyers (they
avoid a hefty depreciation charge, and
benefit from the increased quality in
today’s cars). This has led to one of the
most talked about innovations in the lNorth
American car business: the professional
used car retailer.
Most publicized is Car Max, a new
“franchise”38 created by Circuit City.
Without getting into the very interesting
details, suffice it to say that this event was
founded largely on sophisticated used of
information technology. Car Max has
used information technology to capture
customers, and to capture large numbers
of high quality used cars. As we write,
there is a high probability this systems-
based business will expand rapidly beyond
its experimental plans.
Right now used cars come basically from
auctions around the country, or from
private citizens (trade or private sale).
That means it is costly and time
consuming to get consistently large
numbers of them.
This fact is not lost on the used car
industry. Enter again the speed and
credibility of information.
3s Technically, this is not a franchise, but a wholly
owned system. But the concept is as professional as
any of the new car franchises.
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One company is beginning to offer dealer
used car auctions via video link. That
means dealers can sit at home and bid on
cars thousands of miles away. The service
company employs inspectors at the
auction, so the dealer gets a real person to
inspect the car before it is shipped. Then
the dealer gets right of refusal when the
car actually arrives at his lot; the remote
auction company will take it back.
At first this sounds like a risky business.
But when you consider the scale, speed ,
and quality of information the auction
service has available, the risks are isolated,
and are quite “insurable”. The service
company obviously has a large number of
buyers accessible in his “net”, He also
has several physical check points
(inspectors) to reduce the obvious risks (a
really bad car). Therefore, if a dealer
refuses ultimate delivery, the service
company has a ready market to clear the
vehicle, possibly at a lower price. The
only cash at risk is the cost of
transportation (surprisingly low in a well
coordinated info-tech supported transport
system), the cost of the transaction (the
fractional system cost allocated to the
transaction), and not much else. In a large
enough system, with speedy credible
information, the risks are clearly no worse
than bad debt kinds of risks in large credit
card systems.
With rapidly expanding intemet used car
listing services and others, one can safely
predict that the used car business is rapidly
on its way to a national professionalism
not seen before.
SERVICE AND REPAIR
Remember Dealemet that allowed’ a dealer
to open his service department to the net,
and that sales desk top that puts all the
systems in one place? These come into
play in the very big business service and
repair area.
In the old system, a customer called up,
and talked to a phone person (often not a
trained service technician). Then heishe
comes into the dealer and waits in line to
get “written up”, probably spending time
trying to describe the sound the car is
making. Then the dealer has to diagnose
the problem and get the right parts, and so
on. In all, this is a pretty time and labor
intensive set of transactions. Dealers who
measure it report that the old wait in line
approach often takes 25 minutes per
transaction.
But say this dealer has a Dealernet-like
opening on the world. Customer “nets
in”, sees a menu of possible services, or
of possible “complaints” (the brakes
squeak), Point and click on the relevant
items. Then get a real time version of the
dealer’s calendar, showing the open time
slots. Pick one and point and click. Now
the customer has just done at least 5070 of
what he would have waited in line for, and
the dealer has an advance diagnosis (get
the parts ready). All the documentation,
including any warranty work, is done in
advance, and everything is much more
predictable.
Move one step up the line into parts
distribution. Right now demand occurs as
customers come in with problems.
Urgency is created. The system has to
respond rapidly to unknown data. Under
the new system, there is at least some
window on parts needs well in advance.
This works very much like the new
European car stocking system. Fast and
good information increases, and system
cost decreases,
MANUFACTURING INNOVATION
Let’s take one more step up the line to the
manufacturing organization. Clearly the
market-reaching technologies, and the
point of sale technologies have the
potential to capture tremendous detail on
what customers want in real time.
Remember that these outreach
technologies also can be fitted to the
product spec-ing programs and the
distribution systems.
This means we are probably due for a
major strategic shift in one portion of the
market research business, that portion that
tries to help car companies set annual
planning volumes and schedules for the
thousands of component suppliers. If the
front end technologies can lock into
buyers and shoppers in real time, we
eliminate the need for the vast amounts of
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surveys designed to guesstimate demand
patterns.
This means a portion of what is now the
“marketing” function gets fully
integrated into a cross-functional “system
management” function. It also means
major changes for “logistics” functions
and for inventory expediters (just as just in
time did the same within manufacturing).
It’s been very popular and useful to
redefine business according to their
processes in recent year. Here we have an
emerging example of a major process re-
definition. The speed and credibility of
new information, and the open fluid
architecture of intemet like software will
mean major parts of the auto system can
be managed in completely different ways.
The market facing functions join the
production functions.
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
There are new vistas opening here too.
For years there have been efforts to create
integration between Computer Aided
Design (CAD) and Computer Aided
Manufacturing (CAM). While there have
been many failures in this effort, there are
now major advances happening that mean
early visions show promise.
Here’s a really “out there” idea, The
mathematical models that are used to
create design shapes in CAD, and
manufacturing process in CAD, are very
much the same as the mathematical models
that are used to create much of the new
media . .. .the three dimensional visual
representations now being churned out by
advertising agencies, and the intemet type
developers. In the CAD and CAM world,
design features and production control
process are keyed to points on the CAD
and CAM models.
Real world experiments are showing that
you can take the core of car design type
models and use them to create artistic
renderings of vehicle and vehicle options,
for posting in the new market reaching
media ....while retaining the manufacturing
and design related control points.
This means that in the correct system, one
could publish many designs for public
view, and potential customers can react
(point and click) to things they like and
don’t like ... ..in a format that is easily
translatable back into the engineering and
manufacturing realms of the industy. In
practical terms this means design engineers
and manufacturing process engineers can
directly participate in “customer product
clinics”, with tens of thousands of
customers, with great speed, and possibly
with much lower cost than in current “car
clinics”.
In other industries, such as consumer
electronics, similar systems are being
worked out right now, and it is not such a
leap to carry the concept to the car
business.
CHANGES IN THE “NON SYSTEM
SYSTEM”
How will our new customer behavior affect
the current “media” industry?
It is highly likely that the entire media
industry as currently configured in the car
business is in for a major change. Right
now advertising agencies rarely have direct
relations with manufacturing. TV
broadcasters and media executives likewise
rarely see the engineering process, or even
think about trucking companies.
But in the very near future, the multi
dimensional capabilities of the new media
will create demand for very different
services and very different organizations.
We are likely to see demand for “media
buying” that can open interactive links on
internet like service that require both
engineering and artistic skills. We are
likely to see “push” promotion
transformed into an interactive promotion
in which customers are induced to buy
cars by actually participating in their
designs (one step toward the custom order
car so often envisioned?)
Perhaps we will see the “unbundling” of
the current advertising industry around
some of their current core skills. For
example, intemet and kiosk experiments
both show that the material you post for
customers to see must be very entertaining,
or they simply will not react to it. If they
do not react to it, you don’t capture their
wishes or feelings. Therefore, the
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behaviorally-tuned artistic skill resident in
advertising agencies will almost certainly
be enlisted to devise the “!ook and feel”
of the new systems that will make customer
contact.
Likewise, the “market research” functions
have deep skills in creating questions that
yield actionable results. While they will
have to modify many of their assumptions,
these skilled professionals will no doubt be
called on to structure the functional
software architecture . Why the software
architecture and not just some survey
forms? Because early analysis of intemet
use shows that the sequences that
customers use to “flip through the pages”
of the intemet can be captured and are of
great use in interpreting information about
those customer’s preferences. (For
example, when presented with a digital
mock up of a car interior and its optional
features, which features do they select for
elaboration first, second, third? Which
ones do they return to?) Many of the
creative focus group techniques can be
ported to the net with a little creativity.
With these new functions will come new
responsibilities. While there are a whole
number of metrics used to track
advertising effectiveness right now, in truth
they are often pretty gross measures, with
relatively indirect responsibility, compared
to many factory functions for example.
Without too much imagination, one can
envision a near future in which
“advertising” people must take direct and
measurable cost responsibility for “order
processing” and “factory scheduling” as
“advertising” becomes more of a two-way
facilitation indust~. Agencies will have to
create “artistic assets” that provoke the
right kind of consumer response to
provide swift and credible data to the
manufacturing system and the product
development system. Before you dismiss
this as too strange, consider the fact that
trucking companies once were not
responsible for distribution scheduling, but
now some of them have taken over the
entire logistics and stock management
process for major producing companies.
Likewise, companies that once only sold
computers, now actually run the
communications systems on an outsourced
basis for many customers.
We are very likely to see the complete
transformation of the “dealer advertising”
industry. By most accounts, this runs to
several hundred dollars per car, money
that is probably much better used in new
customer-seeking systems that really
narrow down the targeting and sales
process. Already local and national
newspapers have moved into local intemet
web site production, although they seem
not to recognize how to cheaply and
effectively provide these services.
The broadcast industries, those that are on
the right hand side of our strategic new
media map will also have their work cut
out for them. .% new swift software on
intemet like networks increases, and as the
forms of interactive cable increase, it seems
logical to conclude that industries [hat can
only “push” messages will have to jigh[
for competitive transformation. It would
be rash to speculate specific changes, but it
seems assured that the current economic
equation that supports the business will
change. The distinction between
advertising and content will certainly
continue to change (more
“infomercials’’?), probably to a more
sophisticated and targeted set of
programming, while resting on a core of
the broadest social media products.
The cable and telecom industries seem
very well placed to be right smack in the
middle of the auto new media revolution,
because of their interactivity and
versatility, and one should expect them to
be receiving an increasingly large share of
the financial value now passing through
the advertising agency-broadcast TV
partnership.
In short the media world will have a very
interesting future as the auto and other
industries re-configure their approach to
markets,
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LESSONS FROM THE MARKET:
NEW MEDIA IMPLICATIONS
While the brave new world of electronic
change and linked services seems
confusing and disjointed at times, we can
follow the lessons of history to help chart a
course. Several core truths should stand
out.
LESS ON ONE: CUSTOMERS REALLY
HOLD ALL THE STRATEGIC POWER
Customers like to do what they want, when
they want, and how they want ....and they
will constantly push the edges of the
envelope to preserve their freedoms and
enhance their car owning experience.
Nobody forced people to buy VW Bugs.
The 1976 Honda Accord did not spark a
revolution because it reduced customer
buying and use options; it did so by
increasing customer choices, while
simplifying deep cultural messages.
This market truth can have punishing
effects on those who ignore the often
subtle power of “information
technologies”. Give customers a slight
crack in the dike--- an independent
information source on car reliability, for
example---and they will eventually
provoke a flood of innovation, like the
revolution in manufacturing quality
control of the 1970’s and 80’s. Let
customers spread word of mouth about an
unwanted system like seat belt interlocks
(mid 1970’s), and they will rearrange the
Congressional “safety” agenda. Let car
buyers envision a safe child in a front end
collision, and they will demand’ dual air
bags. Let the informational image grow
that a car accelerated unintentionally, and
departing customers will bring a German
franchise almost to its knees. Ignore the
socially-transmitted image that all
Japanese cars are inherently more
economic and reliable than American cars,
and customers will punish domestic
market share.
On the other hand, those who can manage
the customer drive for better car buying
and driving and the attendant information
management tasks this requires, can take
advantage of underlying customer power.
By creating an interactive tight link
between its industrial systems and its dealer
body, and by taking advantage of the
many ways customers get and transmit
information in a “culture”, Saturn has
become synonymous with “no haggle”
buying.39 By educating large segments
of buyers to the advantages of leasing,
several companies have revolutionized how
“average” car buyers see the economics
of buying new cars: new cars are no longer
huge fixed investments to be afforded
only every 6 or 7 years, they are quite
affordable monthly payments and a fresh
model every two or three years.
lMuch of the strategic positioning in the
capital and technology intensive car
business is about power: the power to
amass large production systems, the power
to stick with markets through tough times,
the power to negotiate with the world’s
largest governments .. ..and the power to
maintain perhaps the largest single
distribution system the world has ever
known. In this environment it is too easy
for powerful companies to loose sight of
the ultimate power . . ..rhe power of
hundreds of millions of customers who
throw around the weight of $1.5 trillion in
car markets. It is precisely this consumer
power that is enhanced by new electronic
media.
New media enhance customer power by
increasing the volume, variety and
credibility of information made available
to the millions of people participating in
the market. “Ordinary” customers now
have almost instant access to information
beyond the dreams and control of dealers
and factories.
39This has implications perhaps far larger than GM
ever expected. In Europe, which faces a distribution
revolution as large as that in the States, “Saturn”
has become a universal symbol among distribution
executive across the whole industry. It has become
an industrial icon of the future, and is likely to
represent the industrial ideology of an entire
continent, far beyond the realities of the actual
Saturn system. This is the power of information
transmitted across the Atlantic.
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Because this information is not proffered
by car companies or dealers, but by
independent information agencies and car
owners themselves, it has a high degree of
credibility.
LESSON TWO: THE AUTOMOBILE IS AN
INFORMATION INTENSIVE PRODUCT
If we were only seeing new forms of
advertising emerging in the new media, the
stakes would not be so high. What are the
attributes of the vehicle buying process
that fit the iatent advantages of the new
media?
Long and emotional buying process
Most people are almost constantly
shopping for cars in their minds.
Enthusiasts, of course, devour the auto
press. But even people who think of cars
as appliances often subtly compare their
cars to others, wish for improvements as
they spill coffee in their laps from hastily
designed cupholders, wish they had been
able to merge with freeway traffic more
easily, hate getting stuck in the snow, and
endure the bragging of the “Jones’ s“
about their new car purchase.
If you suddenly offered 15 million half-
price cars for sale in North America, you
would probably provoke a flood of
“new” buyers, who had really been
readying themselves for a new purchase at
some subconscious level, but who were
waiting for the right time to part with
$20,000, the approximate price of a new
vehicle.
In addition, the process of deciding on a
new vehicle is heavily inveskd with
emotion. For most people the prospect of
picking the wrong vehicle is a fundamental
“fear” that drives them to seek a wealth of
trusted information about prospective
purchases. For one to settle in emotionally
on the right car purchase, one must often
digest not only advertising, and the thinly
veiled promotional articles in popular
press, but the more objective data from
consumerism sources, the negative popular
press (remember rollovers, side impact
fires, and dirt in Japanese seat belt
retainers?), the government (crash tests,
fuel economy, interior volume, and now
“foreign” manufacturing content), and
very importantly word-of-mouth from
other car owners. Most of these data
sources conflict with each other in some
respect (auto press often praise vehicles
that seem to get poor government crash
tests, crash tests on similar models often
seem to conflict), so the process of
digesting all these sources is fraught with
emotional content as customers sense
which sources of information they should
ultimately trust in making their decision.
Information intensive product
Adding to this complex emotional buying
process is the fact that there is so much
information to digest about cars. To make
a decision one must absorb: styling
content, performance (tens of variables),
status image, repair records, safety (again
multiple variables), price and method of
financing, insurance cost, multi-season
drivability, convenience of service,
intangible comfort and “fit” features,
and a host of other attributes conveyed by
even a single vehicle.
And something new has been added to the
information equation: how to buy the car.
Customers now have many “channels”
and purchasing options that a~~
information to the buying process “
Most publicized has been “no haggle”
buying. Some equate this with single price
selling (a la Saturn), but many dealers
differentiate themselves by reducing
anxiety, even if they still negotiate prices.
They will offer an immediate discount
from sticker, even if they are willing to
negotiate further. Many buyers don’t
really care about the last $100 of
negotiation (the emotional price of
dickering is too high), but they know
from the culture that you’re not supposed
to buy a car at sticker price. By offering
an immediate discount, the dealer
eliminates this fundamental emotional
block to the selling process, even if they
are not part of the Saturn franchise. This
means customers must seek information
40 ~uyi~g ~[ub~, warehouse stores, association
buying services, brokers, dealers who sell over the
phone, intemet listings, single brand dealers, auto
mails, etc.
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on the styles of dealers even within single
brand chains.
Ultimately, the purchase (and use) of an
auto is very information intensive, with, up
to now, a high cost of getting enough
trusted information. To the extent the
customer is offered a wide scope of
inexpensive information under his or her
own control , the buying process is
enhanced. Who does not want a better way
to buy a car? What better way to learn
about this than through a low-cost
information seeking process that you
controlled yourself?
Negotiated sale
The ultimate enforcer of the power of new
media is the fact that the buying process is
still largely a negotiated one, even in “no
haggle” chains (where you might have to
“discuss” trade in value of your car ‘1 or
the financial options of ownership. This
means that when it comes time to make the
final cut, the party with the greatest
amount of information is likely to
control . ..or feel in control . ..of the
situation.
This is crucial not only for customers, who
hate to feel “taken, but for dealers and the
entire car industry, whose credibility is
placed on the line with every single
negotiation.
Considering all the work steps in
thousands of vehicle parts, about 20,000
people contribute some effort to every
single car made. Their good efforts can
be completely thwarted by the wrong
attitude of a salesperson... or by a
salesperson who does not know as much as
the customer. In truth, millions hof labor
hours each year rest upon the credibility
of individual sales people, and if they do
not know as much as their customer about
the vehicle, or about competing vehicles,
the credibility of the entire enterprise is
affected in the mind of the customer. The
efforts of 20,000 people who follow just-
in-time manufacturing rules, are wasted if
that car sits in a dealer lot because the
salesperson could not meet customer
4* In limited post-sale interviews, this is the one
area where some Saturn buyers felt a little
uncomfortable about the process.
expectations, or if the customer has
obtained new media information that
conflicts with salesperson information$z.
Many executives who view retailing and
distribution as “moving the iron” do not
understand that industry power rests on
this point-of-purchase fulcrum. Industry
analysts often hear “this is a great car but
customers don’t understand it”.
Companies usually lose market share by
creating unpopular designs, but they can
also lose because they can’t convey the
true attributes of a vehicle in a trusted
manner to a wide variety of customers who
started their shopping long before showing
up in the showroom for the anticipated,
and often odious “negotiation” step of the
buying process..
There are many examples where the
objective measures of the product warrant
increased sales, but where the trusted
information bundle in the customer mind
didn’t cut through the negotiation process.
The most publicized example was the Audi
“sudden acceleration” image. More
damaging perhaps is the American “poor
quality” legacy: despite equal quality
levels, many buyers still project a higher
quality image onto any Japanese car.
Likewise the objective quality
improvement of many European vehicles
is not reflected in greater retail
transactions. Again, there are many
factors at work here, but chief among them
is the information credibility and diffusion
among the millions of people who are
constantly shopping for cars.
And the rubber meets the road in
showroom negotiation. The company
42 we ~1tne55ed many such interactions at dealers.
In one notable instance the customer had correctly
discovered a $1000 rebate through on-line sources,
but the salesperson had not yet been informed of the
incentive. The “pre-sold” customer left quickly in a
huff when the salesperson stiffly argued there was
no such incentive. In another transaction a dealer
wasted more than one hour of selling time he spent
with a family on a Sunday afternoon, because the
family had identified a more advantageous corporate
[ease rate than the dealer could find in his reference
books. In both these cases, the consequences could
have been avoided if the dealer had the same
information sources at his disposal that the
customers had.
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without pre-sale management, and an
informed sales process, will lose the
customer.
The negotiated sale process, laden with
information and emotional content,
requires that car makers and retailers
manage complex information bundles, not
just the engineering and price attributes of
the vehicle. In 1957, the information
meter usually started running at the point a
customer stopped by the dealer to “kick
the tires”. An essential strategic point of
the new media is that “electronic tire
kicking” now starts well before the first
dealer visit. The negotiated sales process
mandates that consumers seek information
before doing battle with dealers, and the
new media systems require that dealers and
car makers understand and manage a
much broader pre-buying information
network than they did even ten years ago,
LESSON THREE: THE FRANCHISE
SYSTEM WILL REMAIN AT THE CORE OF
THESE CHANGES
In simple terms all automotive distribution
and retailing takes place through a legal
agreement, the franchise contract between
the factory and the dealer. Although it
often produces complaints, the basic
system is a good one that allows the
factory some directional control over how
its cars are sold, and allows local business
people a robust way to link up with the
vast production system. The franchise
contract is a basically successful
mechanism to link the retail portion of the
value chain with the engineering and
production part of the chain. In addition,
there are literally tens of billions of dollars
invested in the current f~anchise
infrastructure, which creates a certain
amount of inertia to radical change. Even
if other distribution systems are much
better, they must also generate tons of cash
if they are to replace the investments made
by many citizens in the current system,
Therefore, it is clear people will not soon
be buying 15 million vehicles per year
directly from the production lines “over
the intemet.”
But it is equally clear that customers are
constantly pushing the edges of the system
to get things done in a better way, and new
media will accelerate this.
Perhaps the best way to think of this is to
stop thinking of the franchise system as a
physical entity .... a group of stores legally
attached to the factory. Instead it is useful
to think of the franchise contract as a
“security” that measures the strength of a
factory’s relationship with its customers..,a
legal instrument that has a market-defined
value, much like a share of stock. If a
company does not respond to market
changes and produces a large number of
undesirable cars, fewer people will want to
sell these cars, and the value of the
franchise contract with this maker declines,
If a factory is doing a lot of things right,
and its cars are in demand, the opposite
effect pertains and the value of its
franchise contracts increases. Likewise, if
a dealer does not follow customer demand
well, he reduces the value of his franchise
contract, making it easier for a more
market-tuned dealer to take over the
relationship,
The point is that when one conceives of
the franchise contract as a relationship
between a car producer and the people
buying its cars, and not as a physical
network of stores, then one can see many
new ways to maintain a strong strategic
connection between customer and
producer .....no matter how many ways that
car can get ordered and into customer
hands. Simply put, there is no difference
between a franchisee who sells cars over
the intemet, or by phone, and one who
sells cars through a typical storefront, as
long as they are both meeting customer
needs.
Too often, when some visionary postulates
new electronic ways to sell cars it provokes
a defensive reaction from traditional
retailers and marketers who have much
invested in the existing franchise image.
In truth, the new electronically active
markets are most likely to represent
modern adaptations of the existing
franchise concept, and are only a threat to
organizations who do not perceive the
benefits of electronic market
enhancements.
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THE FINAL LESS ON: THE “OLD MEDIA”
WERE “PUS W’ STAND- ALONE
MEDIA. . . . THE NEW MEDIA ARE “PULL”
MEDIA WITH THE ABILITY TO
INTERCONNECT WITH ALL PARTS OF
THE AUTOMOTIVE DES IGN,
PRODUCTION, AND SELLING SYSTEM
One of the keys to understanding the
“new media” phenomenon is that it is
really not new. The process of seeking
information and shopping preparation is
decades old and is the standard customer
behavior.
The reason to be concerned about the
power of the new media is precisely that it
accelerates and enhances a tried and true
customer driven process, it does not try to
alter the tides of human behavior,,
In this area, we must consider the linkage
between three massive industries: the auto
industry , the “advertising” industry, and
the “media” industry. Owing to the size
and information intensity of the auto
business, these three giants have grown
together. To date, this relationship has
been little affected by the revolution that
took place in global manufacturing, and
the massive economic joint venture
operates according to rules that are very
similar to those of the 1960’s (“let me tell
you how great this car is”).
But the new media trends will change this
accord in very interesting ways. First, we
know that customers like advertising, in its
traditional form, just about as much as
they like the current car retailing process.
And with notable exceptions, advertising is
probably just about as effectiv& as the
dialogue created by car salespeople. Both
are actually effective, but both can benefit
from successful changes.
A major dimension of new media
technologies is that they bring, to the
auto-advertising complex, tools for
improvement that are just as powerful as
“Japanese manufacturing techniques”
were for the manufacturing end of the
business.
It’s hard to find an auto manufacturing or
engineering job that hasn’t been
dramatically transformed over the past 15
years.
A similar technology-driven cultural shift
is hitting the marketing, distribution and
advertising side of the business (in fact this
is happening well beyond automotive
advertising). In simplistic terms, the
traditional model was for the car company
to come up with a very detaileci
“marketing and promotion” specification,
translated to the advertising agency
through the “account” manager process,
converted to “output” by the “creative”
(e.g. “manufacturing”) part of the ~d
agency, then translated over to the “media
buyer” who would get space on the right
“pipes” (TV, magazines, billboards,
matchbooks) to send the right message to
the customer.
Rarely was this process linked directly to
the physical dimensions of distribution, or
to the “hard” processes of engineering
and manufacturing.i3
The magic of “Japanese manufacturing
techniques” was that they required direct
connection between previously unlinked
functions: product engineering, process
engineering, assembly manufacturing,
supplier manufacturing, parts purchasing,
parts logistics, finance, etc. The magic of
the new media is that they will force
connections between many of the unlinked
“market facing” industry functions, the
customer, and the “hard” parts of the
business like manufacturing and logistics.
43Of course there is all kinds of consultation among
different functions in the system, but there are
almost no direct and real time connections.
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ROAD SIGNS FOR INDUSTRY
This article has taken a long walk through
a very complex subject. It is not possible
to detail some of the more operational
innovations that are emerging in this new
media environment, and it is impossible to
predict the future. But, there are some
guiding “truths” that are already founded
in enough actual business to be able to
provide some roadsigns to the future of
the auto system in light of new media
changes.
First, just as the winning new global
manufacturing strategy is based on some
derivative of just-in-time, the new
successful marketing strategies will
exhibit a central theme. Companies will
have to learn how to “give up control to
get ultimate control”.
With a Saturn-like style, but probably with
many different actual methods, companies
will have to devise market facing systems
that listen, seek, move into customers’ lives
without intruding, and generally give up
most of the “push” instincts that have
been so long engrained in the industry.
Customer facing “lip service” will not
work. Strategies and methods will have to
be credible at the customer level, or they
will be ignored. It has been said so many
times that it is cliched, but it is still true that
a partnership with a customer is a much
better economic deal than a pushy
relationship. New media technologies
allow forms of partnership only once
dreamed of in the auto business.
Second, in order to accomplish the first,
auto companies, dealers, advertising
agencies, and others will have to expect
large scaie personnel changes, and
completely new incentive and human
relations systems.
Sales quotas will not work in a pull
environment. Rewards must be set around
satisfying and cost effective individual
customer transactions. In the 1980’s
manufacturing metrics changed from
“keep the line running at all cost” to
“reduce hours per car while increasing
quality beyond conceivable limits” In the
market facing portion of the industry the
ideal metric will be the “hit rate’’ .....an
exact match between customer wishes and
product configuration in the minimum
time after production, with transactions
costs approaching zero. This is easy to
say, but it involves changing the instincts,
incentives, training, and hiring of perhaps
more than 500,000 people in North
America. This wasn’t easy in
manufacturing, and it certainly won’ t be
easy in post-factory businesses.
Third, the culture surrounding the dealer
franchise agreement will have to be
modified so that the form of business
chosen by the dealer is not dictated by the
factory, but is adapted to the local retail
environment.
Again, lip service won’ t work here. The
industry desperately needs more of the
innovative retailers who already work in
the industry, and who work in other
retailing environments. With the right
touches, young business and technological
professionals may actually aspire to be car
retailers, not a typical career path at most
business schools today.
We have been constantly surprised in our
field research at the innovation and
diversity in the North American dealer
base. The good news for the auto
companies is that dealers have in some
fashion, in some place, created almost any
new form of retail enterprise that is
possible, and they are leading the way in
some of the new media areas (although
most car dealer staff are currently not
technologically adept-----a major industry
shortcoming). This means that in some
senses the car companies need only to
follow the lead of successful dealer
innovators, and then find ways to help
spread successful methods throughout the
market system. This will undoubtedly
require cultural change in portions of the
auto industry where the instinct is to try to
control dealers. There is most certainly a
balance point between the amount of
control required for brand identity and
good service, and explicit loosening of
control to allow those closest to the market
to follow customer leads.
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Fourth, very courageous senior car
company managers will have to work up
the support and organizational means to
be able to cancei major car programs,
perhaps on a regular basis, if they do not
sell well, and to plow the saved excess
distribution costs into new market
responsive car programs.
This has turned out to be one of the most
important management skills in running
complex electronics and technology
companies, and the auto business is now
truly a complex technology business, with
shortening product cycles and powerful,
shifting customers.
The instinct in most motor companies is to
“ride out” a slow seller, trying to extract
the greatest amount of cash recovery from
the quite sizable sunk production assets.
Unfortunately if the total system cost of
this product generates excessive
marketing costs, dealer ill-will, and
unexciting customer response in the
marketplace, the perceived cash extraction
from manufacturing assets may be of little
use.
Given that there really is no way to avoid a
pull system in the post-assembly processes,
especially with the advent of new media,
some day, somewhere, some company will
face the terrifying decision of dropping a
$3 billion dollar investment in engineering,
because the marketing costs will have
exceeded the profit potential by a
sufficient amount.4 It will serve this
company well to have the credible,
transparent cost systems in place, firmly
connected to real customer data, so it can
make such decisions accurately and with
broad organizational support. *
Fifth, and related to four, auto companies
will have to find ways to use new media
pull systems to keep attacking industry
system cost and overheads.
u In truth many companies have already been forced
to do this, but they did so in crisis, and without
anticipatory systems that would have cushioned the
impact. The effect on auto equities has often
reflected this “financial drag” on the producing
system.
Otherwise they will lose the global social
competition for capital and talent.
Automotive equities in real terms have
been reduced significantly recent decades.
Simply put, money gets better returns
elsewhere, and in capital markets most auto
companies are useful mainly for their
cyclical play. One dimension of the new
media explosion outside the auto industry
is that it is becoming a significant form of
attractive human endeavor, and it will
consume both talent and capital that will
place broad competitive pressures on the
auto industry. If auto companies can keep
cutting deadweight overheads, by attacking
system inefficiencies in their post-
assembly processes, and by linking
customers directly to manufacturing and
engineering processes, they will be able to
remain a viable place to invest capital and
talent.
Sixth, related to four and five, auto
companies will have to use new media
connections to the customers to solve
some very tricky pending market
segmentation challenges.
For decades the auto industry has been
caught in a pincer of sorts. As volumes of
individual models dropped in the
marketplace, manufacturing and
development costs have risen. This means
companies either have to pick their
segments very carefully, or find ways of
stretching the brands they have to more
customers. In either case, the new media
will provide ways to help, and therefore
will set new competitive standards among
the car companies.
One pressing example is the “golden
handcuffs” of the truck market. When
you cut to the chase, most of the aggregate
“automotive” profit of the past decade
has been owed to the successful sale of
light trucks to “ordinary” car customers.
This is because trucks provided
overwhelmingly positive features for
consumers, that could not be found in
cars. But in truth, at the technical level,
most trucks are “overbuilt” for the
average customer needs, and we are
already seeing market “regression”
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toward a middle ground between trucks
and cars.4s
Already companies are creating
“hybrids” that blend the best features of
trucks and cars. There is very likely to
emerge a complex segmentation challenge
in the large and profitable non-car
segment of the market, and winning
companies will be those who can read the
very subtle signals from customers, and
come up with the right “hybrids” at the
right time, while continuing to invest the
right amount in the “full truck” lines.
Other segmentation challenges are the
“urban vehicle” and “zero emissions
vehicle” questions. Still others relate to
new imports from Europe and experiments
with small run specialty cars.
The auto market never stands still, and it
should be evident that companies with a
finger directly in the “sensory pulse” of
the market will have an advantage in
capital investment and low-cost marketing,
Seventh, car companies will need new
media systems to help them understand
how best to drive the “electronification”
of the motor car.
A whole array of electronic technologies
can be integrated with the motor car to
make it a more versatile participant in the
social system: cellular phones, sound and
environment systems, electronic vehicle
systems, navigation systems, mobile office
systems, and so on. The problem is it is
very difficult and expensive to know how
best to build these in ways that customers
want. Some companies tried to build in
captive cellular phone systems, im order to
raise the value added (prices) in cars, just
about the same time cellular companies
began giving phones away for free.
Given that electronics can easily cost
several thousand dollars in each car, it is
crucially important for the auto industry to
4s The van market is no longer an automatic high
profit winner. Sport utility vehicles are showing
signs of marginal market resistance. Global product
development in “truck like objects” is increasing.
Regulatory costs are likely to pressure margins over
the next several market cycles.
understand how the motor car will fit in
the larger emerging electronic systems
environment. For the most part, most “car
guys” 46 think like mechanical engineers.
In the next century, dominant skills will be
of electronic and software engineers.
Interpreting how the car should interact
with the emerging new media environment
will require using forms of the new media
to get it right.
M Common industry vernacular. Not intended as a
discriminatory comment.
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1 CONCLUSION I
We havecome a long way since car platforms lasted for 8-15 years, since broadcast media
controlled the viewing format of American consumers, since computers were the territory of a
highly specialized elite who walked the refrigerated rooms of mainframes. From the 1950’s
we have had a relatively stable economic balance between the triumvirate of autos,
advertising/media, and information technology. But seemingly overnight, long-growing
trends have met in an arena now dominated by independence and experimentation. Social,
economic, technical , and political boundaries cracked all at once, and we are entering a whole
new period of development.
In short, we are moving into a new economic world driven by technologies none of us fully
,understands. That means we can’ t survey each other and ask what we want, because the
answers will only reflect our current state of experimentation. Life is not as slow as it was
before, and we change our minds with each new innovation. Therefore, the only systems that
can keep us in touch with ourselves, are ones that interact and re-interpret constantly. This
fact has just hit the auto industry in spades. It was changing rapidly already, but it now has
the means and the mandate to make change a daily event.
b
